Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 2/20/07, *Jesse Mazer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > > >I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various > >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the > possibility > >that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you > rub two > >carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas > when you rub > >two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This > could just > >be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any > other > >basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the "no > causal effect" > >criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is > purely and > >necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we > might > >not > >notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would > >certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and > very > >obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine > >empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data > should be > >verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to > >conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. > > > >Stathis Papaioannou > > One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness > could > be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to > as the > "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" arguments, which you can read more > about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, > imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally > identical > devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons > (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they > replaced, > perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either > different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces > more and > more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous > change > (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would > cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the > qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or > fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the > assumption > that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior > should be > indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left > alone. And > if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a > change in my > perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is > wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked > thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between > subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would > contradict the assumption of supervenience (see > http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and > lead to the > possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees > having > complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any > physical > activity within them. > > Jesse > > > It's a persuasive argument, but I can think of a mechanism whereby your > qualia can fade away and you wouldn't notice. In some cases of cortical > blindness, in which the visual cortex is damaged but the rest of the > visual pathways intact, patients insist that they are not blind and come > up with explanations as to why they fall over and walk into things, eg. > they accuse people of putting obstacles in their way while their back is > turned. This isn't just denial because it is specific to cortical > lesions, not blindness due to other reasons. If these patients had > advanced cyborg implants they could presumably convince the world, and > be convinced themselves, that their visual perception had not suffered > when in fact they can't see a thing. Perhaps gradual cyborgisation of > the brain as per Hans Moravec would lead to a similar, gradual fading of > thoughts and perceptions; the external observer would not notice any > change and the subject would not notice any change either, until he was > dead, replaced by a zombie. > > Stathis Papaioannou
An interesting example. Are these people completely blind? Do they describe seeing things? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
