Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 2/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > A patient says that his leg is paralysed, behaves as if his leg is > > paralysed, but the clinical signs and investigations are not > consistent > > with a paralysed leg. The diagnosis of hysterical paralysis is > made. A > > patient claims to hear voices of people nobody else sees, responds to > > the voices as if they are there, but the clinical signs and > response to > > antipsychotic treatment is not consistent with the auditory > > hallucinations experienced by peopel with psychotic illness. The > > diagnosis of hysterical hallucinations is made: that is, they aren't > > hearing voices that aren't there, they only *think* they're hearing > > voices that aren't there. > > How is this diagnosis made? It sounds like an impossible > distinction - a scientific resolution of the zombie question. > > > The diagnosis of "pseudohallucinations" is made if they don't have the > characteristics typical of hallucinations in schizophrenia - that is, > there are third person observable differences. Without these differences > it would be impossible to tell and, since psychiatry at least aspires to > be an empirical science, the possibility is generally ignored. However, > you can have delusions about anything, so it should be at least > theoretically possible to have a delusion that you are having a > perception. Patients frequently report delusional memories of > perceptions: that is, they insist that they had a conversation or > experience that they could not even have hallucinated, because they were > under observation at the time of the alleged incident. Suppose this > process is happening "live", so that they believe they are hearing a > voice and responding as if they are hearing a voice even though they are > not even hallucinating such a thing. We might speculate that the actual > experience would surely feel different to the mere belief that they are > having the experience, but if they could notice such a difference they > would not be deluded. > > Stathis Papaioannou
This comports with the idea that consciousness is a process of making up a narrative history of what the brain's various functional modules considered most important at a given time in order to commit it to memory. I first learned of this theory from John McCarthy's discussion of how to make a conscious robot - but I don't know that he originated it. If it is correct then a malfunction of the brain might cause a narrative to be confabulated that had nothing to do with perception - even perceptions that were acted on appropriately. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
