Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part):
> One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have
> a certain
> mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is
> only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be
> perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such
> and there are others.
We can come back on this if you are really interested, but shortly:
once we assume the computationalist hypothesis (in the cognitive
science/theology), then the picture you give is most probably wrong.
Physics keeps a better role in the sense that physics emerges from the
"whole of arithmetic/mathematic". If you want, the physical world is
not a special mathematical world as seen from inside, but the physical
world somehow is the sum of all possible mathematical world where you
"we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an
infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the
interference of them.
Why a wavy interference? Open problem.
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