On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: 1Z > > > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > > it is in oppostion to it. > > Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? >
It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that computationalism is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to run a conscious program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also hinted in the past that he is not certain about computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
