On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>  From: 1Z
> >
> > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
> > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
> > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
> > Brunoism does not follow.  Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism,
> > it is in oppostion to it.
> Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ?

It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a
physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type
arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that
computationalism is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to
run a conscious program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also
hinted in the past that he is not certain about computationalism.

Stathis Papaioannou

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