I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic binaryly 
digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech.  immagination wander and think 
about analog computers dealing in meanings and functions rather than bits 0 or 
1. In such sense 
SUCH 'physical 'COMPUTER' will run a conscious program, not a mechanisedly 
'consciousified' digital program. 
If called 'computer' at all, it is a tool. Call it 'god' and you are out. 
I cannot blame Peter to be stubborn in "that's we have, (rather: see), that's 
we love" pragmatism. I am irresponsible enough to allow speculative conditional 
Of course only into my 'narrative'. But IMO advancement needs a free 
unrestricted mind and includes fantastic ideas. 
Right or wrong. And of course I am not certain myself.

John M
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2007 10:48 PM
  Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"

  On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

    >  From: 1Z
    > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
    > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
    > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, 
    > Brunoism does not follow.  Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism,
    > it is in oppostion to it.

    Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ?

  It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a 
physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type 
arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that computationalism 
is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to run a conscious 
program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also hinted in the past 
that he is not certain about computationalism. 

  Stathis Papaioannou



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8:34 PM

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