Stathis, I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic binaryly digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech. immagination wander and think about analog computers dealing in meanings and functions rather than bits 0 or 1. In such sense SUCH 'physical 'COMPUTER' will run a conscious program, not a mechanisedly 'consciousified' digital program. If called 'computer' at all, it is a tool. Call it 'god' and you are out. * I cannot blame Peter to be stubborn in "that's we have, (rather: see), that's we love" pragmatism. I am irresponsible enough to allow speculative conditional fantasy. Of course only into my 'narrative'. But IMO advancement needs a free unrestricted mind and includes fantastic ideas. Right or wrong. And of course I am not certain myself.
John M ----- Original Message ----- From: Stathis Papaioannou To: [email protected] Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2007 10:48 PM Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism" On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: 1Z > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > it is in oppostion to it. Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that computationalism is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to run a conscious program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also hinted in the past that he is not certain about computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.26/752 - Release Date: 4/8/2007 8:34 PM --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
