On 12/09/2007, Youness Ayaita <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> The no-justification argues that it doesn't make sense to introduce
> 'existence' as a property, or expressed in another way, that it is not
> possible to meaningfully separate (imaginable) things that have the
> (hypothetic) property that they 'exist' from (imaginable) things
> without that property. This leaves us with two options if we still
> want to use the concept of existence given by the everyday theory:
> that the ensemble of (imaginable) things is empty or that every
> (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. The property is
> degenerate, it does not separate some (imaginable) things from others.
> Since, in our everyday theory, we say that things surrounding us
> exist, we must consequently take the second option: that every
> (imaginable) thing has the property that it exists. This is the
> Everything ensemble.

Are you aware that "existence is not a property" was Immanuel Kant's
answer to the ontological argument for the existence of God? Kant,
however, did not derive modal realism from this.


Stathis Papaioannou

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to