Vladimir Nesov wrote:
>Are you asking why I consider notion of p-zombieness meaningful?
By "p-zombieness" are you referring to philosophical zombies? If so, I
suppose I find them "meaningful" as a philosophical thought-experiment for
making the case that facts about consciousness are at least partly
independent from facts about the physical world, but I don't believe that
any real-world implementation of a mind would be a philosophical zombie (see
Chalmers' argument about 'fading qualia' at
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ) -- do you?
>On 10/2/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Vladimir Nesov wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain
> > >implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie.
> > >Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain)
> > >exists as information content and can be implemented in different
> > >universe. This view can be applied to gradual uploading argument.
> > But why do you think there could be any functionally identical
> > implementations of a part of a brain that would be "zombies", i.e. not
> > really conscious?
> > Jesse
> > _________________________________________________________________
> > It's the Windows Live(tm) Hotmail(R) you love -- on your phone!
> > >
>Vladimir Nesov mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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