On Sun, Apr 29, 2007 at 09:00:57AM -0000, Jason wrote: > > Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: > > 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" > experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- > verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all > branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is > and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move > across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, > therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any > other person.
This is debatable. > > 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which > show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation > thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical > body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to > information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time > does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it > to be the same person? When you've changed enough bits for the person to no longer be conscious (ie for the observer moment so generated to be unexperiencable). > What happens if you make copies of those bits > (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it > elsewhere? > > Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). > The answer is that each duplicate experiences its own observer moment. All other possibilities appear absurd. > Jason > > On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (Jason:) > > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > > altogether. ...>" > > > > Sais WHO? > > > > John > > > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
