On Sun, Apr 29, 2007 at 09:00:57AM -0000, Jason wrote:
> Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy:
> 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person"
> experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi-
> verse.  Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all
> branches?  If all branches where do you draw the line between who is
> and is not that person?  Remember across the multi-verse you can move
> across branches that differ only by the location of one photon,
> therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any
> other person.

This is debatable.

> 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which
> show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation
> thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical
> body for there to be a person.  If a person can be reduced to
> information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time
> does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it
> to be the same person?  

When you've changed enough bits for the person to no longer be
conscious (ie for the observer  moment so generated to be unexperiencable).

> What happens if you make copies of those bits
> (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it
> elsewhere?
> Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but
> I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a
> continuous conscious experience with a person.  For example, how can
> you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of
> some individual?  Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say
> it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them?  Just because
> observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past
> perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that
> follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much
> seems that way subjectively).

The answer is that each duplicate experiences its own observer
moment. All other possibilities appear absurd.

> Jason
> On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Interleaving ONE tiny question:
> >
> > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > (Jason:)
> > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious
> > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity
> > altogether. ...>"
> >
> > Sais WHO?
> >
> > John

A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to