Hi Bruno, Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils' advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct. Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The "accidentally" correctly operating machines need to have their tape rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the rearranging.
So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness. (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below. Bruno Marchal wrote: >Hi George, > >Are you still there on the list? >I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label >saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is >the answer, with a delay of about one year :( > > > >Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote : > > > > >>Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my >>computer. (The original at the Iridia web site >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf >>is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) >> >> > > >Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see >the text. > > > > > >>In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is >>comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the >>recording of an earlier physical process. >> >> > > >Right. > > > > > >>It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that >>consciousness involves two partial processes ... >> >> > >Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean >graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one. > > > Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got involved in his own experiment. >>... each occupying two >>different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a >>recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the >>later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. >> >> > > >But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the >later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later >process has the same physical process-features than the active brain, >although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any >computational process (like a movie). > > > > > >>I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. >> >> > > >ok. > > > > > >>All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness >>does not supervene the physical. >> >> > > >Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming >some form of non-computationalism. >With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness >to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to >the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows >that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but >without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you >implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong. > > > Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment. So this argument does not count. >>The example is just an instance of >>consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of >>a >>physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these >>two time intervals. >> >> > > >The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to >the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached >also to the second process. But then you can force the second process >to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the >counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin >perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter >trois of "Conscience et Mécanisme"). > >So, postulating comp, we have to associate the many possible "physical >brains" to a type of computation, and not the inverse. > >Does this help? > > No. Maudlin cheated. Sorry. George --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---