On 24/10/2008, at 8:44 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> And then there's the big white elephant in the room: consciousness. I
> don't know what it is ...
I am sure you know what it is. I guess you just cannot defined it, nor
prove that it applies to you (it's different).
> and I don't believe it somehow "emerges" from
> brain function.
Ah! See my papers for a proof that indeed consciousness does not
emerge from brain function. See the paper by Maudlin for an
independent and later argument (which handles also the "counterfactual
objection"). You have to assume the body is a machine.
You can find the reference (Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989) here:
I have already explain a lot of this on this list, but if you have
precise question I can answer it. The main thing is the first person
indeterminacy, which forces physics to be a branch of computer
science. To be sure we have mainly discussed the first person
indeterminacy, bearing on the universal dovetailing. I have not
explained the movie-graph/olympia argument, if only because I am not
yet entirely satisfied on the pedagogical level. It is too much
redundant with the Universal Dovetaling argument, but I work on it
(when I find the time).
> I do believe this mystery to be an indication that
> some very fundamental insights are still missing in our model of
The missing insight is the original platonist insight of Plato (but
see also Plotinus). The physical world is the border of "our"
ignorance, with "our" pertaining not to *us the humans* but to *us the
the universal (and mathematical-immaterial) machine. This can be (and
has been) derived from the digital mechanist hypothesis: the idea that
the brain or the body is a machine.
The fundamental science has been named "theology" by the greeks, but
we have to backtrack up to the Aristotle/Plato bifurcation.
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