> Well by your definition a universe is consistent (the inconsistent ones don't
> exist). So given a universe we could look at it as a list of states if it
> could
> be foliated by some parameter (which we might identify as "time").

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The inconsistent ones don't exist, but an abstract description of some
of them does.
> Certainly not all - but I'm not sure what measure would justify "most".
Usually when you restrict a set of things by a specific property,
almost all sets fail to meet that property. As an obtuse example,
almost all natural numbers are larger than any given natural number.
This is only true if we provide a measurable domain, though (you can't
measure "all sets" to begin with...too big), so technically I'm wrong
the way I said it. For most uncountable domains the above would be
true, though.
> That's not quite what you mean - since you've defined them as consistent they
> all are. But I understand what you mean; just giving some specification of a
> universe may very well result in inconsistency and hence failure to actually
> specify one.
Yes.
> Assuming everything exists in some sense, why do we experience this
> particular
> one? If we say "just because" then the everything hypothesis is empty. To
> say
> something more informative we need some measure on "universes". And then we a
> justification for that measure rather than some other.
That's an interesting question, but a very different topic. I like to
think that the experience of one particular reality is just one tiny
facet of a global universal consciousness...that there's no real
difference between one consciousness and the next, so to speak.
As to the topic that I did bring up, I stand by what I said... I
don't think we can assume any universe we can imagine is
mathematically consistent just because we can describe it, because
mathematics has examples where this isn't the case, and I presume that
consistency and existence are the same concept mathematically.
Anna
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