2009/1/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
> On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>>> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are
>>> implementing a process
>>> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
>> Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
>> because they give rise to the sequence of states.
> I agree with you. Now, with the computational supervenience thesis: "
> a causal connection" is the same as a "universal machine".
>  From third person point of view, one causal connection (one UM) is
> enough (and I take the numbers+addition+multiplication) for the ease.
>  From a first person point of view the physics emerge from all
> possible "causal connection" below my substitution level. Comp
> predicts that if I observe myself below the substitution level, I will
> find a sheaf of "local connections".

To clarify my position, I do agree with you that if we accept comp,
ultimately we have to drop physicalism. However, most
computationalists are physicalists. Also, most computationalists are
disturbed by ideas such as those explored in Egan's "Permutation
City", which leads them to invoke rules such as "no consciousness
without the causal links" to prevent such absurdities. But I maintain
that these rules don't work.

Stathis Papaioannou

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