Hi  Quentin,

> I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It  
> concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on  
> the movie hence physical supervenience is false.

OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness  
supervenes on the physical activity of a brain (Phys. Sup.), it shows  
that it leads to the fact that consciousness suoervenes on a movie  
"qua computatio", and this is considered as an absurdity, and so it  
concludes that Phys. Sup is false.

> But if I simulate the graph with a program, and having for exemple  
> each gates represented by a function like "out = f(in)" each  
> functions of the simulated graph is in a library which is loaded  
> dynamically. I can record a run and then on new run I can  
> selectively replace each libraries/functions by another one with the  
> same function contract but which instead of computing the out value,  
> it takes the value from the record. I can do it like in the movie  
> graph for each gates/functions.
> Then it seems that means in the end the consciousness has to  
> supervene on the record...

Why? Consciousness supervenes on the computation(s), not on his  
physical implementation, be it with record or with the original modules.

> then it is the same conclusion than for physical supervenience. What  
> is wrong ?

The physical supervenience. Consciousness does not supervene on any  
implementation "in particular" of a computation. It supervenes on all  
(immaterial) computations going through the (relevant) states. This is  
in Platonia.

Tell me if I miss something, but it seems to me there is no problem  
here. It is just, again, a problem if you believe in some physical  



> Regards,
> Quentin
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> >


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