On 11 Feb 2009, at 21:51, Brent Meeker wrote:

> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>> Welcome back Jack Mallah!
>> I have a different argument against QTI.
>> I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended.
>> Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the
>> QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream
>> should have been be infinite.
> Of course maybe in some other branch of the multiverse your dream is  
> continuing.
> That's what makes everything-theories difficult to test.
> But you raise an interesting point. Everything-theories that suppose
> consciousness is constituted by the closest continuations need to  
> solve the
> "white rabbit" problem.  But that solution, whatever it is, would  
> equally apply
> in dreams.  So why don't dreams have the same physics as waking life?

Ah! That is a good question. It is equivalent to the first person  
white rabbit problem (which was the point of the original white rabbit  
problem in "conscience and m├ęcanisme".

The answer is that dreams are really stabilized by their relative  
apparition with respect to deep computations with high measure. For  
such relativity we need a mechanist notion of first person PLURAL, and  
then I hope the arithmetical hypostases will confirmed this the  
working of such notion.



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