2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>

> 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com>
>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >
>> > Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
>> > consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
>> > implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces
>> reduces the
>> > measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
>> > consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that
>> consciousness is a
>> > computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it
>> doesn't.
>> > Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's
>> vector
>> > in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
>> But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"?
>> Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or
>> observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely*
>> that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness
>> diminish, for example.
>> Jesse
> Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI...

Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a
"next subjective moment"... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority
of "universes" I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot "be dead" hence the
only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that
moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists
then QI holds.


>> >>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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