Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > > > --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not > 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you > use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? > > Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be "a lot more" than > the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the > effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by > the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) > and the effect of child mortality is small. > > > I don't get it. Why should the "measure" suddenly decrease at 80 (or > 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? > > Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my > next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all > momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current > moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30 > would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts > that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next > moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes > everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now > whatever the measure of now and in one minute is. > > Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2 > times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel > less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a > conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these > attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not > striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the > real here and now is.
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
