Kelly wrote: > On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Kelly, >> >> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt >> in my mind about computationalism. >> > > Excellent! > > It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of > this. > > So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea > that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains > third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I > think. > > BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness > arises. Where does that fit in with physicalism? So the next step is > to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the > computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in > addition to behavior and ability. > It's really cool to see folks exploring where I have been and seeing the same problems. I might be able to shed a little light on a productive 'next step' for exploration:
Try understanding the difference between a natural world which IS literally a mathematics, not a natural world described BY a mathematics. Note that a Turing machine is an instrument of a 'BY' computationalism, not the natural computation that I am speaking of. If you can get your head around this, then the answers (to a first person perspective) can be found. Stop thinking 'computation OF' and start thinking 'natural computation that IS'. Also very useful is the idea of using the explanation of a capacity to do science (grounded in a first person experience that is, in context, literally scientific observation) ... this is a very testable behaviour and represents the last thing physicists seem to want to explain: /themselves/. A green field in which it is obvious that cognition is most definitely not computation in the 'computation BY' sense. Enjoy! colin hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
