Kelly wrote:
> On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch <> wrote:
>> Kelly,
>> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
>> in my mind about computationalism.
> Excellent!
> It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
> this.
> So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea
> that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains
> third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I
> think.
> BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness
> arises.  Where does that fit in with physicalism?  So the next step is
> to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the
> computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in
> addition to behavior and ability.
It's really cool to see folks exploring where I have been and seeing the 
same problems. I might be able to shed a little light on a productive 
'next step' for exploration:

Try understanding the difference between a natural world which IS 
literally a mathematics, not a natural world described BY a mathematics. 
Note that a Turing machine is an instrument of a 'BY' computationalism, 
not the natural computation that I am speaking of. If you can get your 
head around this, then the answers (to a first person perspective) can 
be found. Stop thinking 'computation OF' and start thinking 'natural 
computation that IS'. Also very useful is the idea of using the 
explanation of a capacity to do science (grounded in a first person 
experience that is, in context, literally scientific observation) ... 
this is a very testable behaviour and represents the last thing 
physicists seem to want to explain: /themselves/. A green field in which 
it is obvious that cognition is most definitely not computation in the 
'computation BY' sense.


colin hales

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