On 25 Apr 2009, at 22:52, Kelly wrote:
> > On Apr 24, 11:39 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> At any given instant that I'm awake, I'm >>> conscious of SOMETHING. >> >> To predict something, the difficulty is to relate that consciousness >> to its computational histories. Physics is given by a measure of >> probability on those comp histories. > > The laws of physics would seem to be contingent, not necessary. On the contrary/ Physical laws appear are necessarily non contingent with comp. They are defined through all computations in Platonia. > In > that I can imagine a universe with an entirely different set of > physical laws. Thre is no universe. You already "belong" to all comp histories going through your actual states. of course all states are actual from inside, but only "normal states" remains normal, and there are physical laws only in normal histories. Physicalness is a product of that "normality" conditions on histories. > > > Further, assuming that computer simulations of brains are possible > and > give rise to consciousness, OK. That is comp. My working hypothesis. > I can imagine that a simulation of such a > brain could be altered in a way that the simulated consciousness > begins to perceive a universe with these alternate physical laws. Only relatively to you. From the first person point of view of the inhabitant of your altered simulation, they don't belong to it, but to the infinity of simulation in Platonia. If your alteration in such that the 1-view of those inhabitant escape from normality, from their point ofviex they esacpe your "universe". With comp there is no identity thesis. There is a 1-1 relation going from a machine to a mind, but the inverse is 1-infinity: to each mind state there is an infinity of machine realizing it. The first person indeterminacy is exploitable to extract the laws of physics. > Or > even begins to perceive a universe with no consistent coherent > physical laws at all. The question is; what are their relative probability measure? What can I expect. > > > >>> And I'm conscious of it by virtue of my >>> mental state at that instant. In the materialist view, my mental >>> state is just the state of the particles of my brain at that >>> instant. >> >> Which cannot be maintained with the comp hyp. Your consciousness is >> an >> abstract type related to all computations going through your current >> state. > > I see what my "current state" does here with respect to > consciousness. But I don't see what the "computations going through > it" contribute. They contribute to the measure which gives sense to the "universal" physical laws. > > > >>> I won't worry about it too much, as there is no doctor, only my >>> perceptions of a doctor. Every possible outcome of the "brain >>> replacement operation" that I can perceive, I will perceive. >> >> Not in the relative way. You have to explain why you see apples >> falling from a tree, and not any arbitrary information-theoretical >> data. > > I explain it by asserting that there are many versions of me, some who > see apples, and some who see arbitrary information-theoretical data. > Everything that can be perceived is perceived. Without giving me a measure, it is like your theory predicts everything. This is contradicted by the fact. If I want coffee now, I know all to well I have to do something for that. Sorry but I cannot wait for a white rabbit bringing me my cup of coffee. > > > >>> Including outcomes that don't make any sense. >> >> You have to explain why they are *rare*. If not your theory does not >> explain why you put water on the gas and not in the fridge when you >> want a cup of coffee. > > I don't say that they are rare, I say they don't make any sense. A > big difference. > If they make any sense then they does not exist in Platonia, except in non standard mathematical representation (due to incompleteness). Then they have better to be rare relatively to my current state, or your theory is deflationnary: it predicts every-events. > I say that every possible event is perceived to happen, and so nothing > is more or less rare than anything else. It has to be at least in the relative way, if not your theory predicts all happenings, even in practice, but the facts contradict this. > There are only things that > are rare in your experience. This is what comp can explain. This is what the universal dovetailer got normal explanations of measure one. The counting algorithm does not. > They are not rare in an absolute sense. Probably. I don't know because the proba are always relative with comp, but this is an old discussion (cf ASSA/RSSA). > > > Why do I say this? Because I think that platonism is the best > explanation for conscious experience, and the above view is (I think) > the logical conclusion of that platonic view of reality. I agree with the platonism. And it is because the computations are ion platonia that the whole thing works. > > > >>> Thus the talk of >>> probabilities and measures. I'm willing to just say that all >>> universes are experienced. >> >> That is absolutely true. But we don't live in the absolute (except >> perhaps with salvia :). > > I say that we do live in the absolute. Not all experiences of the > absolute will be strange. If all possible experiences exist in the > absolute, then by definition some will be quite ordinary and mundane. > Right? Sure. But only in normal (measure 1) histories they remain normal. If you don't address the first person, singular and plural, indeterminacy problems, you don't solve the mind body problem, nor the body problem (the origin of the appearance of a stable physical universe). > > > But, right, salvia gives a taste of how strange experience can be. > And also schizophrenia, dementia, and various other mental conditions > and abnormalities cause by damage to the brain are further examples. > > How does your computational theory consciousness explain the > perceptions of these people? By the Galois connection between machine and behaviors, or equation and surfaces, or theories and models. If you have a system of equation, and decide to drop out some equations, making the system more little, you get more solutions, more hypersurfaces realizing the reamining equations. Similarly when you drop out axioms from a theory, the theory will have more models. Similarly when you "diminish" a brain, you enlarge the possible consciousness. The consciousness of the universal person (universal consciousness) exists in Platonia. Its "platonic brain" is any little theory + induction axioms. It differentiate through the consistent extensions, which exist also in Platonia. So many such extension exists that a notion of normality and stability is necessarily perceived from inside: the physical laws emerge. Making a part of your brain sleepy or perturbated can let you experience unusual but real reality types. > > > >> That is true, but we want to explain "the stable appearance of atoms >> and galaxies", and what happens when we die. > > Some observers will see stable atoms and galaxies. Because that's one > of the possible sets of experience. Other observers won't see these > things. I can explain to you that almost all observers will observe the same physical laws everywhere in Platonia. You are the one saying that physics is contingent now. The nice thing with comp is that physics is necessary, and necessarily the same for all observers/universal machines. Only geography and history can be (very) different. Practically when we die, things are more complex to predict, because you shift toward less normal world and (I think) you can come back to universal consciousness, an amnesic state where you forget the more particular differentiated dreams. It is an open problem to evaluate the probaility to survive with all your memories, like if your normal life continues (it is not null, but at each DU-step k it is multiplied by something (much) less than 1/2^k, I think. > > > >> You are right. But consciousness is the only thing I have no doubt >> about. The *only* undoubtable thing. The fixed point of the cartesian >> systematic doubting attitude. A theory which eliminate my first >> person, or my consciousness, although irrefutable by me, is wrong, I >> hope, I hope it to be wrong for you too. (Why would I send a post on >> consciousness to a zombie?) > > Right, I'm with you on this. Consciousness is the one thing that > can't be doubted. And that's where the trouble starts... That's where science stars. That is why we have fun discussing theories and arguments :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
