Hi Jesse,

On 30 Apr 2009, at 11:19, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Search MGA 1, MGA 2,  (and forget MGA 3 I don't like it) in the  
> recent threads on this list. Or read the french versions in my two  
> theses. Or wait I put my last paper on my web page.
> Let us see:
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/search?hl=en&group=everything-list&q=MGA&qt_g=Search+this+group

It is more easy with this link:




>> >If you believe that consciousness supervene on the physical  
>> implementation, or even just one universal machine computation,  
>> then you will associate consciousness to a description of that  
>> computation.
>> But why must I do that? Why can't I associate consciousness to a  
>> causal structure in the real world that's isomorphic to the causal  
>> structure of the computation, not just a passive description of the  
>> computation?
> Because in a particular running what makes the structure causal can  
> be physically inert. This means that if you attach consciousness to  
> it, you are attaching consciousness to something abstract. No  
> problem, both consciousness and computations seems to me abstract or  
> immaterial at the start. But then, unless you introduce a physical  
> selection principle (unrelated to the abstract computation), you  
> have to attach consciousness on all abstract realization of the  
> computation. The machine cannot know which computation (or which  
> mathematical universal machine) implements its states, forcing to  
> consider the whole abstract space of all computations, which  
> fortunately makes sense (through Church thesis).
> Put in another way: a digital machine cannot distinguish between  
> real, virtual or arithmetical. Unless magical power not present in  
> the computations is introduced to select a reality.
>> Is there a fatal flaw in my suggestion about defining "causal  
>> structure" in terms of propositions about events and the way  
>> certain propositions logically imply others
> No fatal flaw. On the contrary, it is the good idea. I do this too.  
> But then you cannot rely on particular "concrete things" to select  
> one computations among all possible one. You already move to the  
> abstract, or mathematical or logical. I just insist to push that  
> idea to its ultimate consequence. The seemingly realness or  
> concreteness will have to emerge from an infinity of absract, but  
> well defined, computations. No Token, many Types. Token are types  
> view from inside. Comp gives an indexical (self-referential) way to  
> explain concrete token from abstract types.
>> (if you take into account the basic laws of whatever 'universe'  
>> you're describing with these propositions, whether it's the laws of  
>> physics in the real universe or the laws governing a cellular  
>> automaton)?
> If you survive "qua computatio", you cannot make a consciousness  
> singular in the absolute. A concrete machine (relatively concrete  
> with respect to you) can be endowed with consciousness, but from its  
> first person view, its future (and past, and reality)  is determined  
> by all sublevel computations that the machine cannot distinguish.
> If you attach an evolving mind to a cellular automaton states'  
> sequence, you have to attach that same mind to all relative  
> implementations of that sequence generated in the universal  
> dovetailing, or in elementary arithmetic, and this change the  
> prediction that the automaton can make about what it can find when  
> it looks at himself or at his neighborhood below its substitution  
> level. There are many consequence of this. For example you can  
> deduce that whatever the physical universe is, it is not a classical  
> cellular automaton, nor the result of any classical evolving  
> system.  At best, it could be a quantum cellular automaton, but even  
> this should be deduced from a relative measure on *all* computations.
> I hope this can help, I am aware (and Maudlin is too as he told me a  
> long time ago) that this point is a bit subtle and rarely well  
> understood.
> Note that Maudlin concludes that there is a problem with comp, and I  
> conclude there is a problem with the physical supervenience. We both  
> agree that comp and physical supervenience are incompatible. I keep  
> comp as my favorite working hypothesis, and so I attach  
> consciousness, not to any implementation of a computation, but to  
> all at once, and only through logical links at some level.
> When the computations differentiate up to the point the machine can  
> tell the difference, consciousness bifurcate or differentiate. It  
> remains to justify why the quantum computations seem to win the  
> competition among all computations, but classical computer science  
> gives clues that this could indeed be the case when we take the self- 
> referential limitations explicitly into account (cf AUDA). This  
> would prevent comp from solispisme: there would be a coherent notion  
> of first person plural. There are also evidences from pure number  
> theory.
> Feel free to criticize MGA, I appreciate (rational) critics by non  
> person eliminativist researcher.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >


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