On 30 Apr 2009, at 13:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/4/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>> This is essentially the problem discussed by Chalmers in "Does a Rock
>> Implement Every Finite-State Automaton"
>> at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html ,
>> Yes. And I don't buy that argument. I will not insist because you  
>> did it
>> well in your last post. Also, if it was the case that rock implement
>> sophisticated computations, it would just add some measure on some
>> computations in the Universal Dovetailing. Also, a rock cannot be a
>> computational object: it is a projection of an infinity of  
>> computations when
>> we look at the rock at a level which would be below our common  
>> substitution
>> level. Eventually we will met the quantum vacuum (assuming comp  
>> implies QM,
>> as I think), and in some "parallel world" that vaccum will go  
>> through all
>> accessible states, but this is part of so many variate histories  
>> that they
>> interfere destructively and does not generate any classical history  
>> stable
>> relatively to any observer coupled with the rock.
>> and I think it's also the idea behind Maudlin's Olympia thought  
>> experiment
>> as well.
>> Maudlin's Olympia, or the Movie Graph Argument are completely  
>> different.
>> Those are arguments showing that computationalism is incompatible  
>> with the
>> physical supervenience thesis. They show that consciousness are not  
>> related
>> to any physical activity at all. Together with UDA1-7, it shows  
>> that physics
>> has to be reduced to a theory of consciousness based on a purely
>> mathematical (even arithmetical) theory of computation, which  
>> exists by
>> Church Thesis.
>> The movie graph argument was originally only a tool for explaining  
>> how
>> difficult the mind-body problem is, once we assume mechanism.
> The Rock argument and the Olympia/ Movie Graph argument are
> diffferent, but they lead to the same conclusion if valid, namely that
> if computationalism is true then consciousness does not supervene on
> physical activity.

I don't see why. If the rock implement conscious computation, this  
would just enrich the domain measure.

> Putnam and Searle use the Rock argument to suggest
> that computationalism is false: they consider it absurd that any
> conscious computation supervenes on any physical activity (or
> equivalently no physical activity, since at one extreme the Rock
> argument allows that any computation is implemented by the null
> state).


> Chalmers tries to rescue computationalism in the paper cited
> by arguing that the Rock argument is not valid.

He tries to rescue "materialist computationalism". But this exactly  
what Olympia/movie-graph does not allow.
I guess this is also why Chalmers defends dualism, even for quantum  
mechanics without collapse.
When I met Chalmers he told me he stops at UDA step 3 (and left the  
room without much explanation). Some of its more recent writing  
indicates that he has perhaps change its mind, I dunno.


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