On 23 Jul 2009, at 13:31, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

## Advertising

>>> These universes are >>> universes with a two-dimensional space and a one-dimensional time. >>> These GoL-universes are mathematial universes. They have an initial >>> condition and a mathematical rule that defines how that universe >>> will >>> look like in the next moment, and the next next moment, and so on. >>> >>> Does this make sense for you? >> >> Those are not universes, but computational histories. > > What is wrong with computational histories? If you can explain > everything in our universe with a computational history, why do you > need > anything more? First, conceptually, there is that idea at the base of the "everything" list, which is that an ontology of everything is conceptually simpler that any "something". Second, there is some empirical facts sustaining that nature superposes the physical states and physical histories. This needs explanations. Third there is an argument showing that any rational agent believing in its own Turing emulability will believe, soon or later, that if it is so, it will detect the parallel histories when observing its neighborhood sufficiently closely (that is: below its level of substitution). If you take the first person into account, you can understand that NO universal machine can known in which computational history or histories she belongs too. But things are more complex than that, all universal machine can know that there is a sense to say that she belongs simultaneously to ALL computational histories "responsible" for what "happens" below their substitution level. The Universal Dovetailer Argument is a step by step reasoning intended to show what can possible be a physical universe from a universal machine point-of-view. It is an easy exercise to prove that all humans are universal machine (at least). Comp is somehow the thesis that we are not more than that, except for our current mental constructs. > > >> Assuming comp there is a first person indeterminacy, which makes >> "physical appearances" or "physical universe" emerging from the >> infinity of such computational and universal computation. I suggest >> you read the UDA papers. I guess you were not yet on the list when I >> explained why "Wolfram" sort of computational physics, based on >> cellular automata, does not work. > > Yes, I was not on the list then. And all the time when I have been on > the list, I have wondered what COMP is? You can ask or better consult: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html The first six steps are rather easy, so read, ask question if you don't understand, I am doing the step seven in its mathematical precise form, slowly, you can take the train up to enlightenment :) Comp is the hypothesis that "I (you) am (are) a digitalisable machine". It is a stronger thesis than the "strong AI" thesis, (machine could think without us being machine) but it is very weaker version than the comp used by neurophilosophers, which assume brains are enough for consciousness. "I" or "we" could be the entire galaxy, or even the entire physical universe (the day this got some meaning) for example, but this appears at the seventh step of UDA. If we are physically analog machines, comp can still be true. To make comp false you have to introduce in the brain (whatever it is) something non turing emulable, like an actual infinite analog design playing a role in the computation (it is much more than an oracle). > > >> And quantum mechanics confirms this by giving indirect but strong >> evidences on the existence of many statistically interfering >> computations. > > I do not believe in that quantum mechanics implies statistically > interfering computations. ? > I believe that quantum mechanics is > deterministic. From the 3-person view, me too. But Schroedinger Equation predicts that if I look, in the base {up, down} an electron which I have prepared in the state 1/sqrt(2) (up+down) that I cannot predict in any way which of up or down I will see. Exactly like in the self-duplication experiment. > Microcosmos looks indeterministic just because we do not > know yet what is happening at the Planck scale. You must think of > that > a quark is 100.000.000.000.000.000.000 times bigger than the Planch > length, so many things can happen in that interval. I can return that argument: the way the arithmetical computations interfere makes it obviously still open today if machine's consciousness singularize or not the physical reality. I strongly doubt it, but it is not an important question for me. Up to know comp predict even too much indeterminacy. The key point is that if we are machine, physics can no more be the fundamental science. Mathematics becomes more fundamental, mathematical "theology" even more. And I try to explain how the explicit assumption of being machine makes possible to get a mathematical formulation of the mind body problem, which leads to see physics as a sort of topological border of mathematics, as seen by a universal mathematical machine "living" inside. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---