*Reality **versions(?)* continued...
----------------------------------------
In his post Benjamin Jakubik wrote:
"Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since you
>> already presume the appearance of matter,
>
> I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality".
> If not, I would not post message on a list.
Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense independent of
that, because..."
--------------

IMO to 'presume' the *appearance* of matter is not more than what I call
(Colin's) *perceived reality* - our own figment at the mental level we *can
and do* muster.

Bruno's *(nowhere(!) assumed)* "primitive matter" would transcend the
'perceived' - so it seems irrelevant in this respect, however... he assumes
a *"consensual reality"* .
In whch case a 'consensual' would be even weaker than a 'perceived' - this
being a
 "one-person" mindset and does not require (consensual) agreement from many.

I still feel that 'numbers' lurk somewhere in these - non primary -
hills....(as not 'primitives'!) - no matter how imaginative it would be to
'express' anything with long-enough series of them.
My ceterum censeo (sorry, Bruno)

John M

On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 3:08 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Ronald:
> WHAT is reality? 'physical' is one degree weaker, it is most likely based
> on observations we call 'physical' in the figment: physical world(view) -
> the poorly understood/explainable - as the article puts it: 'ontological in
> science' - explanatory figment.
> John M
>
>   On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 7:18 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3433.pdf
>> any comments on this?
>>                    Ronald
>>
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