*Reality **versions(?)* continued... ---------------------------------------- In his post Benjamin Jakubik wrote: "Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since you >> already presume the appearance of matter, > > I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality". > If not, I would not post message on a list. Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense independent of that, because..." --------------
IMO to 'presume' the *appearance* of matter is not more than what I call (Colin's) *perceived reality* - our own figment at the mental level we *can and do* muster. Bruno's *(nowhere(!) assumed)* "primitive matter" would transcend the 'perceived' - so it seems irrelevant in this respect, however... he assumes a *"consensual reality"* . In whch case a 'consensual' would be even weaker than a 'perceived' - this being a "one-person" mindset and does not require (consensual) agreement from many. I still feel that 'numbers' lurk somewhere in these - non primary - hills....(as not 'primitives'!) - no matter how imaginative it would be to 'express' anything with long-enough series of them. My ceterum censeo (sorry, Bruno) John M On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 3:08 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > Ronald: > WHAT is reality? 'physical' is one degree weaker, it is most likely based > on observations we call 'physical' in the figment: physical world(view) - > the poorly understood/explainable - as the article puts it: 'ontological in > science' - explanatory figment. > John M > > On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 7:18 AM, ronaldheld <[email protected]>wrote: > >> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3433.pdf >> any comments on this? >> Ronald >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
