On 19 Dec 2009, at 18:08, John Mikes wrote:

> Reality versions(?) continued...
> ----------------------------------------
> In his post Benjamin Jakubik wrote:
> "Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since  
> you
> >> already presume the appearance of matter,
> >
> > I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality".
> > If not, I would not post message on a list.
> Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense  
> independent of
> that, because..."
> --------------
>
> IMO to 'presume' the appearance of matter is not more than what I  
> call (Colin's) perceived reality - our own figment at the mental  
> level we can and do muster.
>
> Bruno's (nowhere(!) assumed) "primitive matter" would transcend the  
> 'perceived' - so it seems irrelevant in this respect, however... he  
> assumes a "consensual reality" .


I borrow the term "consensual reality" from the salvia divinorum user  
community, mainly to refer to the kind of reality you come back too  
after an experience.
I do believe in such reality, although not in it being fundamental. I  
have to believe in it to just decide to answer a post. If I was not  
"pretty sure" it does exist, given that I cannot doubt my  
consciousness, I would become a solipsist.
So I do believe in things like UK, Obama, trees, bosons and galaxies.  
Those are mind constructs, with hopefully some referents. Then,  
assuming comp, and thus elementary arithmetic,  Mechanism can explain  
where such beliefs come from, and why numbers get through a befuddling  
path with discourses on "matter", "time" and "consciousness" etc.

A philosopher who would stop to believe in consensus reality would  
stop to publish or posting anything.




> In whch case a 'consensual' would be even weaker than a 'perceived'  
> - this being a
>  "one-person" mindset and does not require (consensual) agreement  
> from many.

Yes.


> I still feel that 'numbers' lurk somewhere in these - non primary -  
> hills....(as not 'primitives'!) - no matter how imaginative it would  
> be to 'express' anything with long-enough series of them.
> My ceterum censeo (sorry, Bruno)

You are welcome,

Best,

Bruno



> On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 3:08 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Ronald:
> WHAT is reality? 'physical' is one degree weaker, it is most likely  
> based on observations we call 'physical' in the figment: physical  
> world(view) - the poorly understood/explainable - as the article  
> puts it: 'ontological in science' - explanatory figment.
> John M
>
> On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 7:18 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>  
> wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3433.pdf
> any comments on this?
>                    Ronald
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
> .
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
> .

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


Reply via email to