Not to hijack my thread, but even if Physics is just a subbranch of PA, I have difficulty conceiving of numerical computations happening without matter/energy. Ronald
On Dec 19, 12:08 pm, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > *Reality **versions(?)* continued... > ---------------------------------------- > In his post Benjamin Jakubik wrote:"Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since you > >> already presume the appearance of matter, > > > I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality". > > If not, I would not post message on a list. > > Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense independent of > that, because..." > -------------- > > IMO to 'presume' the *appearance* of matter is not more than what I call > (Colin's) *perceived reality* - our own figment at the mental level we *can > and do* muster. > > Bruno's *(nowhere(!) assumed)* "primitive matter" would transcend the > 'perceived' - so it seems irrelevant in this respect, however... he assumes > a *"consensual reality"* . > In whch case a 'consensual' would be even weaker than a 'perceived' - this > being a > "one-person" mindset and does not require (consensual) agreement from many. > > I still feel that 'numbers' lurk somewhere in these - non primary - > hills....(as not 'primitives'!) - no matter how imaginative it would be to > 'express' anything with long-enough series of them. > My ceterum censeo (sorry, Bruno) > > John M > > > > On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 3:08 PM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ronald: > > WHAT is reality? 'physical' is one degree weaker, it is most likely based > > on observations we call 'physical' in the figment: physical world(view) - > > the poorly understood/explainable - as the article puts it: 'ontological in > > science' - explanatory figment. > > John M > > > On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 7:18 AM, ronaldheld <[email protected]>wrote: > > >>http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3433.pdf > >> any comments on this? > >> Ronald > > >> -- > > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > >> "Everything List" group. > >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >> [email protected]<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > >> . > >> For more options, visit this group at > >>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
