You may be right. But it is still an open problem to just define probability (except the probability one) in the mechanist settting. Rich metaphor, but a promise for a lot of work, to make this precise enough in the mechanist frame. It would mean that not only we have a measure (and a linear base of observable/operators) but also a richer differential structure. Who knows? You may try to be more precise, even without taking the mechanist constraint into consideration.

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With non-mechanism, you may consider Penrose's (very speculative) idea that mind reduces the wave by being related to gravitation (space-time curve). Not sure it makes really sense, but then, with non-comp, we may try ... everything. It seems obvious to me that Bayes is a particular case of inference. There are *many* others. Bruno On 30 Dec 2009, at 11:51, marc.geddes wrote: > I came up with this metaphor which hopefully indicates the > relationship between the three main types of inference (Symbolic, > Bayesian and Analogical). > > --- > > Picture a mind as a space, and 'the laws of mind' are analogous to the > principles of cognitive science. > > Now in this 'mind space' picture the 'mind objects' - I suggest these > are logical predicates - symbolic representions of real objects. How > do these 'mind objects' interact? I suggest picturing 'mind forces' > as analogous to the 'strengths of relationships' between the mind > objects (predicates or variables) so 'mind forces' are probability > distributions. But what about the background geometry of mind space? > I suggest picturing 'curvatures' in the geometry of mind space as > analogous to concepts (categories or analogies). > > Then Symbolic logic is the laws governing the mind objects (rules for > manipulating predicates). Bayes (Probability Theory) is the laws > govering the mind forces (rules about probability distributions), and > Analogical inference (categorizaton) is the laws governing the > geometry of mind space itself (concept learning and manipulation). > > --- > > If my metaphor is valid, the radical implication is that analogical > inference is the true foundation of logic, and Bayes is merely a > special case of it. Why? Consider that *apparent* Newtonian forces > operating across physical space are actually just special cases of > curvatures in the geometry of space-time itself. What I'm suggesting > is *exactly* analogous to that physical picture. I'm suggesting that > *apparent* probabilistic operations in mind space are actually just > special cases of 'curvatures' in the 'geometry' of mind space > (categorization and analogy formation). > > --- > > The question of course is whether my metaphor is valid. I'm very > confident, but I could be wrong. Comments or thoughts welcome. > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.