2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>

>  Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>
>
>>  Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>
>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com <mailto:
>>>> meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>>>>        2010/1/7 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
>>>>         <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>                A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere,
>>>>                with false
>>>>                memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may
>>>>                never happen, is a
>>>>                perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate
>>>>                it along with
>>>>                all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever,
>>>>                this program will
>>>>                be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program
>>>>                that generates
>>>>                it sequentially;
>>>>
>>>>            How do you know this?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to
>>>>        the White
>>>>        Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often
>>>>        discussed
>>>>        over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
>>>>        provides a summary. The general idea is that structures
>>>>        generated by
>>>>        simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to
>>>>        write a
>>>>        program that computes a series of mental states iteratively
>>>>        than one
>>>>        that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc
>>>>        data.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>                and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
>>>>                S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more
>>>>                likely to have
>>>>                been generated sequentially, the point remains that
>>>>                there is nothing
>>>>                in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That
>>>>                is, the fact
>>>>                that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and
>>>>                remembers a smooth
>>>>                transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1
>>>>                really did happen in
>>>>                the past, or even at all.
>>>>
>>>>            We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a
>>>>            processing of
>>>>            information.  And we're also assuming that this processing
>>>>            can consist of
>>>>            static states placed in order.  So given two static
>>>>            states, what is the
>>>>            relation  that makes their ordering into a computational
>>>>            process?  One
>>>>            answer would be that they are successive states generated
>>>>            by some program.
>>>>            But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1
>>>>            doesn't seem to
>>>>            answer the question because "remembering" is itself a
>>>>            process, not a static
>>>>            state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or
>>>>            information
>>>>            content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property -
>>>>            as for example, if
>>>>            S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper
>>>>            representation of
>>>>            states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of
>>>>            my memories most of
>>>>            the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to
>>>>            type (though
>>>>            maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        You've made this point in the past but I still don't
>>>>        understand it. If
>>>>        S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in
>>>>        your
>>>>        brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
>>>>        experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance
>>>> by
>>>>        causally disconnected processes?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    No, I don't.  Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes,
>>>> I
>>>>    would experience much the same thing.  But it is not at all
>>>> convincing
>>>>    to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period
>>>> would
>>>>    be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration,
>>>>    discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any
>>>>    at all.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        The requirement would be only that
>>>>        the respective experiences have the same subjective content in
>>>>        both
>>>>        cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
>>>>        important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then
>>>>        both S1
>>>>        and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they
>>>> are
>>>>        typing is.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant
>>>>    duration and even overlap.  They are no longer discrete, static
>>>>    states.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>        It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
>>>>        completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without
>>>>        making
>>>>        any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
>>>>        unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
>>>>        simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may
>>>>        have no
>>>>        awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely
>>>>        be left
>>>>        out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end
>>>>        of your
>>>>        post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is
>>>> described
>>>>    by a sequence of discrete states.  But in an actual realization of
>>>>    such
>>>>    a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in
>>>>    time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This as no impact on the computational level, what is important is the
>>>> logic state which is discrete. What is running on an actual computer is a
>>>> program... that the physical computer use 3V or 1V or less or that it can
>>>> handle 5*10^9 instructions per second or 5000 doesn't change that fact, the
>>>> program will run the same (with regard to the (external) execution speed).
>>>> If consciousness is "digitalisable" then it follows that it is composed of
>>>> discrete states with no duration at all. The "time"  inside the program 
>>>> does
>>>> not need to be related to an (our) external clock. I could represent "time"
>>>> in an imaginary program by a counter... the fact that between two steps a
>>>> million year has passed, inside the program only the next counter value is
>>>> given, so only "1" has passed for the pov of the program.
>>>>
>>>> So if we want to see the consequences of the computational hypotesis, we
>>>> must first take for granted that we are digitalisable, hence the
>>>> particularities of a specific physical instantiation have no impacts on 
>>>> what
>>>> the program is running (the consciousness). As the running of that program
>>>> on a virtual machine running on a specific physical instantiation has no
>>>> impact, as the running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
>>>> running ...
>>>>
>>>
>>> But the point is that the above is a lot more than needed to say "yes" to
>>> the doctor.  You could say yes to the doctor without believing that the time
>>> and casual connection of states was irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>> Ok, but it is no more the computational hypothesis.
>>
>>
>>  Isn't it?  Bruno presents "comp" as equivalent to betting that replacing
>> your brain with a digitial device *at the appropriate level of
>> substitution *will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected.
>>
>
> Ok, this means that there exist a functional substitution which running
> under a UTM will generate your stream of consciousness. This means that it
> exists a program ( a sequence of logic instruction) that "is linked" to your
> consciousness. If computationalism is true, functional equivalence is true
> (if not, not even a compiler could work)... this means there exists an
> infinity of implementation of the same program (logic)... an infinity of
> "software" implementations... as well taking physicalism view, an infinity
> of physical implementation. In any way, what is relevant is the logic, what
> links those states.
>
> As Stathis point out, in the set of every program (generated by the UD),
> there exist a (an infinity of) program that compute S2 (having the necessary
> input data to compute it) without ever have computed S1. But the measure of
> that particular program (an instantiation of the computation of S2) is
> nothing compare to the set of program computing S2 with Logic L computing
> the transition from S1 to S2 having computed S1 prior.
>
> Time is an internal notion, assuming computational supervenience,
> consciousness has access only to what it has access... no need to put a
> trenscendant time in here, independant of the process.
>
>
> I'm not appealing to a transcendent time.  I'm pointing out that if S1 and
> S2 are states consciousness or observer-moments they will have duration as
> measured in computational steps and having duration they may be connected
> into a sequence by overlap - which is different and more restrictive than
> just being part of the same computation or one having "memory" of the
> other.  I'm challenging the idea that consciousness can be sliced into
> discrete states whose order is determined only by their content.
>

I'm ok with that... as I said to Stathis, those program have infinitesimal
measure... that what I call HP world. What is important in computational
hypothesis is computation, HP are corner case of computation... they are (a
tiny) part of the infinity of instantiation below our level of substitution.



> It might be true, but I don't think it follows from comp=digital brain
> substitution and I think it introduces other problems.
>

It doesn't... I follow you on that.


>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
>>  From this people are inferring that the discrete states of this digital
>> brain instantiate "observer moments".  But suppose (which I consider likely)
>> the digital brain would have to have a cycle time of a billionth of a second
>> or less.  I don't think you believe you have a different conscious thought
>> every billionth of a second.  What it means is that "a state of your
>> consciousness" corresponds to a million or so successive states of the
>> digitial computation.  These sets of a million states can then of course
>> overlap.  So the idea of discrete "observer moments" doesn't follow from
>> "yes doctor".
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Think of it like a computer movie file... the movie is stored by
>>>> frame... the movement is illusory.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  An illusion provided by the finite duration of you brain responses.
>>>
>>
>> Finite data gathering ok... finite duration is begging the question.
>>
>>
>>  I'm not sure I understand that remark.  ISTM the finite duration of your
>> visual response is essential.  If it were ten times faster the movie would
>> look like it was being played at 3 frames/sec.  Movements in the movie look
>> smooth because your eyes and brain blur successive frames together.
>>
>>
> I mean that you are putting "time" as a non turing emulable thing.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>> Quentin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    Brent
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    --
>>>>    You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>    Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>>    To post to this group, send email to
>>>>    everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>>>     <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.
>>>>
>>>>    To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>    
>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>>>>     
>>>> <mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%252bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>>.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    For more options, visit this group at
>>>>    http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>>>> .
>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>>> .
>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>>
>>  ------------------------------
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>> .
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> ------------------------------
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
> .
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to