2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <[email protected] <mailto: >> [email protected]>> >> >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>>: >> >> >> >> A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, >> with false >> memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may >> never happen, is a >> perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate >> it along with >> all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, >> this program will >> be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program >> that generates >> it sequentially; >> >> How do you know this? >> >> >> Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to >> the White >> Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often >> discussed >> over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book >> provides a summary. The general idea is that structures >> generated by >> simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to >> write a >> program that computes a series of mental states iteratively >> than one >> that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc >> data. >> >> >> and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although >> S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more >> likely to have >> been generated sequentially, the point remains that >> there is nothing >> in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That >> is, the fact >> that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and >> remembers a smooth >> transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 >> really did happen in >> the past, or even at all. >> >> We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a >> processing of >> information. And we're also assuming that this processing >> can consist of >> static states placed in order. So given two static >> states, what is the >> relation that makes their ordering into a computational >> process? One >> answer would be that they are successive states generated >> by some program. >> But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1 >> doesn't seem to >> answer the question because "remembering" is itself a >> process, not a static >> state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or >> information >> content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property - >> as for example, if >> S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly seems a proper >> representation of >> states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of >> my memories most of >> the time. Even as I type this I obviously remember how to >> type (though >> maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it. >> >> >> You've made this point in the past but I still don't >> understand it. If >> S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in >> your >> brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be >> experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by >> causally disconnected processes? >> >> >> No, I don't. Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I >> would experience much the same thing. But it is not at all convincing >> to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would >> be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration, >> discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any >> at all. >> >> >> The requirement would be only that >> the respective experiences have the same subjective content in >> both >> cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an >> important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then >> both S1 >> and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are >> typing is. >> >> >> But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant >> duration and even overlap. They are no longer discrete, static >> states. >> >> >> It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be >> completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without >> making >> any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely >> unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a >> simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may >> have no >> awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely >> be left >> out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end >> of your >> post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is. >> >> >> >> You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is described >> by a sequence of discrete states. But in an actual realization of >> such >> a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in >> time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap. >> >> >> This as no impact on the computational level, what is important is the >> logic state which is discrete. What is running on an actual computer is a >> program... that the physical computer use 3V or 1V or less or that it can >> handle 5*10^9 instructions per second or 5000 doesn't change that fact, the >> program will run the same (with regard to the (external) execution speed). >> If consciousness is "digitalisable" then it follows that it is composed of >> discrete states with no duration at all. The "time" inside the program does >> not need to be related to an (our) external clock. I could represent "time" >> in an imaginary program by a counter... the fact that between two steps a >> million year has passed, inside the program only the next counter value is >> given, so only "1" has passed for the pov of the program. >> >> So if we want to see the consequences of the computational hypotesis, we >> must first take for granted that we are digitalisable, hence the >> particularities of a specific physical instantiation have no impacts on what >> the program is running (the consciousness). As the running of that program >> on a virtual machine running on a specific physical instantiation has no >> impact, as the running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine >> running ... >> > > But the point is that the above is a lot more than needed to say "yes" to > the doctor. You could say yes to the doctor without believing that the time > and casual connection of states was irrelevant. > > Ok, but it is no more the computational hypothesis.
> > >> Think of it like a computer movie file... the movie is stored by frame... >> the movement is illusory. >> > > An illusion provided by the finite duration of you brain responses. > Finite data gathering ok... finite duration is begging the question. Quentin > > Brent > > >> Quentin >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> >> [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:everything-list%[email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> >> >. >> >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.--
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