2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>

> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com <mailto:
>> meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
>>
>>
>>    Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>        2010/1/7 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
>>        <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>:
>>
>>
>>
>>                A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere,
>>                with false
>>                memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may
>>                never happen, is a
>>                perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate
>>                it along with
>>                all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever,
>>                this program will
>>                be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program
>>                that generates
>>                it sequentially;
>>
>>            How do you know this?
>>
>>
>>        Why S2 is unlikely to appear out of nowhere is equivalent to
>>        the White
>>        Rabbit problem in ensemble theories, which has been often
>>        discussed
>>        over the years on this list. Russell's "Theory of Nothing" book
>>        provides a summary. The general idea is that structures
>>        generated by
>>        simpler algorithms have higher measure, and it is simpler to
>>        write a
>>        program that computes a series of mental states iteratively
>>        than one
>>        that computes a set of disconnected mental states from ad hoc
>>        data.
>>
>>
>>                and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
>>                S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more
>>                likely to have
>>                been generated sequentially, the point remains that
>>                there is nothing
>>                in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That
>>                is, the fact
>>                that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and
>>                remembers a smooth
>>                transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1
>>                really did happen in
>>                the past, or even at all.
>>
>>            We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a
>>            processing of
>>            information.  And we're also assuming that this processing
>>            can consist of
>>            static states placed in order.  So given two static
>>            states, what is the
>>            relation  that makes their ordering into a computational
>>            process?  One
>>            answer would be that they are successive states generated
>>            by some program.
>>            But you seem to reject that.  To say that S2 remembers S1
>>            doesn't seem to
>>            answer the question because "remembering" is itself a
>>            process, not a static
>>            state.  I tried to phrase it in terms of the entropy, or
>>            information
>>            content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static property -
>>            as for example, if
>>            S2 simply contained S1.  But that hardly seems a proper
>>            representation of
>>            states of consciousness - I'm certainly not conscious of
>>            my memories most of
>>            the time.  Even as I type this I obviously remember how to
>>            type (though
>>            maybe not how to spell :-) ) but I'm not conscious of it.
>>
>>
>>        You've made this point in the past but I still don't
>>        understand it. If
>>        S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in
>>        your
>>        brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be
>>        experience them as consecutive if they were generated by chance by
>>        causally disconnected processes?
>>
>>
>>    No, I don't.  Of course if they had durations of seconds or minutes, I
>>    would experience much the same thing.  But it is not at all convincing
>>    to me that the experience at the beginning and end of the period would
>>    be identical - and hence in the limit of infinitesimal duration,
>>    discrete states I'm not sure what the experience would be, if any
>>    at all.
>>
>>
>>        The requirement would be only that
>>        the respective experiences have the same subjective content in
>>        both
>>        cases. Memory is only one aspect of subjective content, if an
>>        important one. If S1-S2 spans the typing of a sentence, then
>>        both S1
>>        and S2 have to remember how to type and what the sentence they are
>>        typing is.
>>
>>
>>    But here you have allowed S1 and S2 to be processes with significant
>>    duration and even overlap.  They are no longer discrete, static
>>    states.
>>
>>
>>        It may seem to be unconscious but obviously it can't be
>>        completely unconscious, otherwise it could be left out without
>>        making
>>        any difference. Your digestion is an example of a completely
>>        unconscious process that need not be taken into account in a
>>        simulation of your mind. Another example is your name: you may
>>        have no
>>        awareness at all of your name during S1-S2 so it could safely
>>        be left
>>        out of the simulation, although at S3 when you reach the end
>>        of your
>>        post and you need to sign it you need to remember what it is.
>>
>>
>>
>>    You are relying on the idea of a digital simulation which is described
>>    by a sequence of discrete states.  But in an actual realization of
>>    such
>>    a simulation the discrete states are realized by causal sequences in
>>    time which are not of infinitesimal duration and overlap.
>>
>>
>> This as no impact on the computational level, what is important is the
>> logic state which is discrete. What is running on an actual computer is a
>> program... that the physical computer use 3V or 1V or less or that it can
>> handle 5*10^9 instructions per second or 5000 doesn't change that fact, the
>> program will run the same (with regard to the (external) execution speed).
>> If consciousness is "digitalisable" then it follows that it is composed of
>> discrete states with no duration at all. The "time"  inside the program does
>> not need to be related to an (our) external clock. I could represent "time"
>> in an imaginary program by a counter... the fact that between two steps a
>> million year has passed, inside the program only the next counter value is
>> given, so only "1" has passed for the pov of the program.
>>
>> So if we want to see the consequences of the computational hypotesis, we
>> must first take for granted that we are digitalisable, hence the
>> particularities of a specific physical instantiation have no impacts on what
>> the program is running (the consciousness). As the running of that program
>> on a virtual machine running on a specific physical instantiation has no
>> impact, as the running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
>> running ...
>>
>
> But the point is that the above is a lot more than needed to say "yes" to
> the doctor.  You could say yes to the doctor without believing that the time
> and casual connection of states was irrelevant.
>
>
Ok, but it is no more the computational hypothesis.


>
>
>> Think of it like a computer movie file... the movie is stored by frame...
>> the movement is illusory.
>>
>
> An illusion provided by the finite duration of you brain responses.
>

Finite data gathering ok... finite duration is begging the question.

Quentin


>
> Brent
>
>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>
>>    Brent
>>
>>
>>    --
>>    You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>    Groups "Everything List" group.
>>    To post to this group, send email to
>>    everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>    <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.
>>
>>    To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>    
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>>    
>> <mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%252bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>> >.
>>
>>    For more options, visit this group at
>>    http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>> .
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
> .
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>
>
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to