Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But of course relativity tells us there is no canonical way to foliate
the universe; your experience is local and is determined by your past
light cone, not by the "now" hypersurface.
2010/1/6 Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>:
As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it
generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next.
Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which
is generating what we understand to be some observer moments for us at
this particular time. This is where I was thinking of the foliation
bit - each hypersurface is a snapshot in time of the universe as
experienced by me.
This being said would that not mean they would
necessarily be in order or are you thinking that some other program.
could generate by chance a perfectly good observer moment that was out
A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false
memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a
perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with
all the others. If the UD is allowed to run forever, this program will
be a lower measure contributor to S2 than the program that generates
How do you know this?
and similarly in any physicalist theory. But although
S2 may guess from such considerations that he is more likely to have
been generated sequentially, the point remains that there is nothing
in the nature of his experience to indicate this. That is, the fact
that S2 remembers S1 as being in the past and remembers a smooth
transition from S1 to S2 is no guarantee that S1 really did happen in
the past, or even at all.
We're assuming that thought is a kind of computation, a processing of
information. And we're also assuming that this processing can consist
of static states placed in order. So given two static states, what is
the relation that makes their ordering into a computational process?
One answer would be that they are successive states generated by some
program. But you seem to reject that. To say that S2 remembers S1
doesn't seem to answer the question because "remembering" is itself a
process, not a static state. I tried to phrase it in terms of the
entropy, or information content, of S1 and S2 which would be a static
property - as for example, if S2 simply contained S1. But that hardly
seems a proper representation of states of consciousness - I'm certainly
not conscious of my memories most of the time. Even as I type this I
obviously remember how to type (though maybe not how to spell :-) ) but
I'm not conscious of it.
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