David Nyman wrote:
 Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?

I suspect there's a problem either way.  AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different renditions of a
given state of affairs (hence not "identical" in any
non-question-begging sense of the term). It then follows that, in
order to fully account for a given set of events involving both
renditions, you have to choose between some sort of non-interacting
parallelism, or the conundrum of how one "causally closed" account
becomes informed about the other, or the frank denial of one or the
other rendition.  None of these options seems satisfactory.

I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all "causally closed". In fact, thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of what caused them.


The way out would be if both 3-p and 1-p were reconcilable in terms of
a more fundamental level, in terms of which the special relevance of
each partial narrative was linked to its proper range of outcomes.  In
point of fact, of course, this is the "folk psychological" position,
and it seems all too easy simply to dismiss this as terminating in
naive dualism.  However, my early-morning musings include a glimmering
of how this might be made to work - without doing terminal violence to
either rendition - but unfortunately there is insufficient space in
the margin of this post to write it down (as yet).


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