On the many-worlds FAQ:

It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple,
identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate:

"Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split?
Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a measurement-like
interaction (See "What is a measurement?") as having previous existed
distinctly and merely differentiated, rather than the interaction as
having split one world into many? This is definitely not permissable
in many-worlds or any theory of quantum theory consistent with
experiment. Worlds do not exist in a quantum superposition
independently of each other before they decohere or split. The
splitting is a physical process, grounded in the dynamical evolution of
the wave vector, not a matter of philosophical, linguistic or mental
convenience (see "Why do worlds split?" and "When do worlds split?")
If you try to treat the worlds as pre-existing and separate then the
maths and probabilistic behaviour all comes out wrong."

However, just below, in the Many-minds question:

"Q20 What is many-minds?
Many-minds proposes, as an extra fundamental axiom, that an infinity of
separate minds or mental states be associated with each single brain
state. When the single physical brain state is split into a quantum
superposition by a measurement (See "What is a measurement?") the
associated infinity of minds are thought of as differentiating rather
than splitting. The motivation for this brain-mind dichotomy seems
purely to avoid talk of minds splitting and talk instead about the
differentiation of pre-existing separate mental states."

Based on the answers provided in this FAQ, it sounds as though many-minds
permits differentiation of pre-existing observers whereas many-worlds does
not permit differentiation.  The many-minds interpretation also sounds much
more similar to computationalism as described by Bruno.  Computationalism +
arithmetical realism supposes that all possible computations exist, and
yield all possible observers.  Therefore, the consciousness of these
observers would differentiate, rather than split, since they all existed
beforehand.  What are others thoughts on this FAQ or reasoning?  Is there
something many-minds offers over many-worlds?  How exactly does
differentiation conflict with experimental evidence and the predicted
probabilities?  How does many-minds lead to interference patterns, or only
allow a photon one exit path from an interferometer?  Is this the primary
question for computationalism to answer?


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