On 5/2/2010 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 May 2010, at 20:30, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
This argument is not
definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of
consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical basis for
consciousness it seems pretty good.
Ha! As long as you assume there is no problem of consciousness, then
there's no problem! That is pretty good.
So you do have a theory of consciousness in which we can have
timeless thoughts?
DM (digital mechanism, comp ...) entails somehow that all thought
are timeless;
That's one of the assumptions of DM, that thoughts are states. But
that seems doubtful to me. At the "substitution level" there are
states, but those are too finely divided to correspond to thoughts.
Thought are not state. Thought correspond to infinities of sequences
of states: at least one for any universal machine, given that the UD
run all UDs executed by all universal machines. This makes a lot of
number relations involved in the epistemological existence of
(conscious, first person) thought. The thought are really in the
abstract structures realized by those infinities of sequences of
states. Now, all this is defined already in Platonia and is timeless.
Time belongs to the thought, it is part of the qualia.
Ok. So sequence is part of thought, and I suppose that supplies the
direction of time we experience with the thought. So while the thought,
as described in Platonia, is timeless it's experienced as timed because
of the sequential structure.
But thoughts related to universal machines which makes them felt as
being embedded in time-structure.
Amazingly enough some plants can make you live timeless
consciousness (google on salvia divinorum reports). Despite DM, I
thought such experience was not "memorizable", but apparently they are.
Are these timeless thoughts expressible in sentences? or are they like
images?
Let me make some comments related to other posts:
About TS (technological singularity): I have a theory according to
which this happens each time an universal entity generates an
universal entity. In that sense the following are probable examples
of TS:
- the big bang (in the theories where that exists)
- the origin of life
- the origin of brain
- the origin of thought
- the origin of languages
- the origin of computers/universal machine
- the origin of programming languages
etc.
All those TS, and infinitely many others, exist out of time and
space in any unravelling of arithmetical truth.
The Löbian machine is the most intelligent entities that can exist,
but "programming it" make it a slave, and its "soul falls".
What some people call TS is not when machine will be as clever as
us, but as stupid as us, probably. Stupidity develops when we
confuse competence and intelligence. Intelligence is needed to
develop competence, but competence has a negative feedback on
intelligence.
About BB (Boltzmann brains):
BB provide a physicalist rendering of the (mathematical) UD paradox.
The UD, and thus elementary arithmetic, generates all BB's states,
in infinitely many histories. You can extract the measure on them by
the use of the logic of arithmetical self-reference,
What measure is that?
The one which extends the 'measure one' given by S4grz1, or/and Z1*,
or/and X1*.That is, the material hypostases. The measure exists if the
arithmetical quantum logic, (with quantization of p defined by BDp,
with B and D the box and diamond of S4grz1 or/and Z1* or/and X1*)
fulfills von Neumann criterion for being the "right' quantum logic: it
defines the orthostructure on which a "theorem of Gleason" makes it
possible to extend the measure 1-calculus into the full calculus
(measure in [0 1]).
Doesn't that require a continuous probability operator? How is that
consistent with the digital nature of comp?
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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