Have you still an objection? I am not sure I remember.
I think I have answered your 'environment objection' by the fact that
the UD reasoning remains unchanged with the notion of "generalized
brain". DM is, from that point of view very weak. The substitution
level can be so 'low' that you are captured only by the quantum state
of the "whole observable (or not) universe!
To negate comp you may think of analog quantum eden garden (that is:
not UD accessible, nor arithmetically verifiable, not solution of a
diophantine equation). Or take a non computable solution of
Schroedinger equation, like Ae^-i*omega*Ht, H some Halmitonian, and
omega for some incompressible Chaitin number.
But I am not sure we have concluded on the objection made by Jack.
It would certainly help to put the finger on the difficulty. (it is
the most difficult point perhaps).
Suppose consciousness supervenes on the activity of some computer, and
this in such a way that the artificial complex glial-neuron FF76A89,
say, is never used. Could it be that consciousness would NOT have
supervened in case that complex glial-neuron FF76A89 would have been
missing, (in an exactly identical digital virtual environment, for the
sake of the discussion)? Jack seems to believe this.
It seems weird to me that for defending the "real time"-physical-
supervenience-thesis, you have to take into account the presence of
objects having no physical activity relevant with the actual physical
activity for that computation. Sure, they have a physical presence,
but to require this presence for the supervenience introduces an
element preventing saying "yes" qua computatio to the doctor. If the
mere presence of an element is needed, it can only mean, for a
computationalist, that the level of substitution was incorrect, even
if only for a period of activity. Like Stathis explained it makes
consciousness here and now, contingent on future event, and it
introduce zombies, if not partial zombies.
Consciousness concerns abstract things, which can be considered as
attribute of person(s) or living being(s). It is related to the truth
about the relations that universal Löbian machines can have with
themselves and with their most probable universal neighbors. Universal
machine represents themselves relatively to those neighbors. It is a
continuum of neighbors, given the fact that all universal machines
(even those with oracle) competes simultaneously, below your
Maybe a problem: DM could make the observable reality truly fractal.
Universal machines are relatively dynamical mirrors.
And from inside the complexity seems unbounded and non enumerable. Are
fractals quantum mechanical compatible? Is it quantum chaos? The one
"generated" by the prime numbers? Is quantum chaos Turing Universal?
Is the "quantum level", which is really an level of isolation and
independence of computations, the DM substitution level, or is the
substitution lower (like we would have a quantum brain), in which case
topological computations somehow wins on the universal dovetailing?
I think computer science can help to formulate the problem.
Computationalist supervenience can be defined, without any requirement
of having a notion of causality. Physicalists point on some universal
system, where DM asks for a justification, by taking account of the
consciousness (first person) indetermination. Reality should be
invariant for the choice of the universal system taken as basic.
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