On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 11 Nov 2010, at 02:37, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >>> >>> Bryan Caplan: >>> >>> Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only >>> because we understand them to be true; but if determinism is correct, >>> then we automatically accept whatever beliefs that our constituent >>> micro-particles impose on us. It might be the case that those >>> micro-particles coincidentally make me believe true things, but the >>> truth would not be the ultimate causal agent acting upon me. >>> >> >> Whatever truth is, it isn't a causal agent. > > > There is plausibly no sense to see truth as the ultimate "causal" agent.
If you are proposing a logico-mathematical underpinning for reality, then aren’t you thereby proposing that truth *is* the ultimate causal agent? In that the nature of reality is determined by “true” logico-mathematical statements, and not by the “false” logico-mathematical statements? What causes only true statements to have an effect? > We have good reason to believe that our brains are not so bad dynamical > mirror of the most probable consistent neighborhoods. Why only consistent neighborhoods? Why couldn’t inconsistent neighborhoods (a la Graham Priest) have role in determining the nature of reality? > Eventually beliefs work *because* they are (self) determined, like > 'free-will' can be seen as relative partial self-determination. How do beliefs determine themselves? Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
