On 14 Nov 2010, at 22:17, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Nov 14, 2010 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 11 Nov 2010, at 02:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/10/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only
because we understand them to be true; but if determinism is
then we automatically accept whatever beliefs that our constituent
micro-particles impose on us. It might be the case that those
micro-particles coincidentally make me believe true things, but the
truth would not be the ultimate causal agent acting upon me.
Whatever truth is, it isn't a causal agent.
There is plausibly no sense to see truth as the ultimate "causal"
If you are proposing a logico-mathematical underpinning for reality,
then aren’t you thereby proposing that truth *is* the ultimate causal
Well, if I am willing to accept a brain Turing emulable transplants,
(arithmetical) truth is a big enough realm to explain machine's
believes in realties and reality, and it is (absolutely) undecidable
if we need more at the utimate level. We know there is necessarily
(much) more epistemologically. SoI suggest this by comp + some occam
In that the nature of reality is determined by “true”
logico-mathematical statements, and not by the “false”
Well, this is a bit like asking if the Mandelbrot set is determined by
the points belonging to it, or by the points not belonging to it. But
the explanation of life, consciousness relies on the (interesting)
What causes only true statements to have an effect?
If I smash two protons with enough energy, either I will get a boson,
or not. I will say that something has an effect if, by definition, it
is true that it has an effect.
If that was not the case, I could answer all your question by "because
2+2=3". I am pretty sure this will not have the "right effect".
We have good reason to believe that our brains are not so bad
mirror of the most probable consistent neighborhoods.
Why only consistent neighborhoods? Why couldn’t inconsistent
neighborhoods (a la Graham Priest) have role in determining the nature
Priest handles paraconsistency, not arithmetical inconsistency. Priest
can be modeled in arithmetic by a sentences of the type Bf (not on the
type f). This is because G* proves DBf (the consistency of the
provability of the false).
Eventually beliefs work *because* they are (self) determined, like
'free-will' can be seen as relative partial self-determination.
How do beliefs determine themselves?
By self-reference. Like a Löbian machine proving that Bp -> BBp. (If I
can prove p, then I can prove that I can prove p).
For example, by Löb's theorem, sentences (machines' beliefs) asserting
their own provability are true and provable. Machine's beliefs can
bootstrap themselves a bit like a placebo medication.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at