On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Rex,
> > Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source)
> > where someone asked "Who pushes who around inside the brain?", meaning is it
> > the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the
> > opposite?  The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make
> > this a difficult question to answer.  If the highest levels of thought and
> > reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say
> > we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few
> > steps?
> Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws
> acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings,
> whatever) could account for human behavior and ability.
> So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain,
> then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces

No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument
to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not
the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion
> And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to
> serve that role.  1Z and I discussed this in the other thread.
> We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and
> behavior of chess playing computers

Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s "intentional stance"

>- and while human behavior and
> ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in
> the same general category.

Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction:

Humans are a complex sort of robot. Humans have intentionality.
Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to