On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> > Rex,
>
> >> > Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source)
> >> > where someone asked "Who pushes who around inside the brain?", meaning 
> >> > is it
> >> > the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the
> >> > opposite?  The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, 
> >> > make
> >> > this a difficult question to answer.  If the highest levels of thought 
> >> > and
> >> > reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to 
> >> > say
> >> > we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a 
> >> > few
> >> > steps?
>
> >> Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws
> >> acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings,
> >> whatever) could account for human behavior and ability.
>
> >> So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain,
> >> then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces
>
> > No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument
> > to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not
> > the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion
>
> “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather
> than some other way.


If a higher level description is a  valid description of
some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of
why the result happened given the initial conditions

It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will
microphysical causality

> Only causal explanations do that.
>
> > .
> >> And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to
> >> serve that role.  1Z and I discussed this in the other thread.
>
> >> We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and
> >> behavior of chess playing computers
>
> > Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s "intentional stance"
>
> See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees.
>
> >>- and while human behavior and
> >> ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in
> >> the same general category.
>
> > Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction:
>
> > Humans are a complex sort of robot.
>
> Wild speculation.
>
> As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability
> and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness.
> Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot.

Is human consciousness causally effective?

> > Humans have intentionality.
>
> Granted.  I do anyway.  So at least one human does.
>
> > Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality
>
> Not proven.

Neither is your version of the argument

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