On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote: > On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > Rex, > > >> > Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) > >> > where someone asked "Who pushes who around inside the brain?", meaning > >> > is it > >> > the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the > >> > opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, > >> > make > >> > this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought > >> > and > >> > reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to > >> > say > >> > we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a > >> > few > >> > steps? > > >> Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws > >> acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, > >> whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. > > >> So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, > >> then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces > > > No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument > > to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not > > the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion > > “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather > than some other way.
If a higher level description is a valid description of some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of why the result happened given the initial conditions It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will microphysical causality > Only causal explanations do that. > > > . > >> And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to > >> serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. > > >> We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and > >> behavior of chess playing computers > > > Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s "intentional stance" > > See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. > > >>- and while human behavior and > >> ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in > >> the same general category. > > > Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: > > > Humans are a complex sort of robot. > > Wild speculation. > > As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability > and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. > Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? > > Humans have intentionality. > > Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. > > > Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality > > Not proven. Neither is your version of the argument -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
