On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> My position is:
> >> So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't.
> >> If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice.  No free will.
> > Unless you determined the reason.
> How would you do that?  By what means?  According to what rule?  Using
> what process?
> If you determined the reason, what determined you?  Why are you in the
> particular state you're in?
> If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into
> some particular choice, then there's still no free will.  The rule
> determined the choice.

And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet
as required

> >> =*=*=*=
> >> As for my definition of free will:
> >> "The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused."
> >> Obviously there is no such ability, since "random" and "caused"
> >> exhaust the possibilities.
> >> But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway.
> > Free Will is defined as "the power or ability to rationally choose and
> > consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought
> > about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances".
> How does this differ in meaning from my definition?  I don't think it does.
> > Not that according to this definition:
> >   1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by
> > external circumstances.
> OK.  Not in conflict with my definition.
> >   2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. ("Rationally
> > choose and consciously perform").
> OK.  Not in conflict with my definition.
> >   3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It
> > does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones
> > actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives
> Related by what?  Deterministic rules?  Probabilistic?

> If one's actions are determined by ones thoughts and motives, what
> determines one's thoughts and motives?
> And why do some particular set of thoughts and motives result in one
> choice instead of  some other?  If there is no reason for one choice
> instead of the other, the choice was random.
> >   4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that
> > all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not
> > entirely un-free. ("...at least some of which...").
> OK.  Not in conflict with my definition.
> >   5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely
> > free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require
> > an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select
> > actions from what is physically possible.
> Select using what rule?  What process?  What mechanism?  Magic?
> Either there is a reason that you selected the action you did, in
> which case the reason determined the selection - or there isn't, in
> which case the selection was random.
> Also the phrase "from what is physically possible" is suspicious.  If
> the natural laws determine what is physically possible, don't they
> determine everything?

Not if they are probablistic. In a probablistic universe,
some things are still impossible

> Where does this leave room for free will?
> "the ability to select actions from what is physically possible"
> Select by means that is neither random nor caused.  Okay.  That's what I said.

Select means it is neither determined nor unreasoned

> >   6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about
> > the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory,
> > according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body.
> > That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be
> > taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of
> > mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained.
> OK.  Not in conflict with my definition.
> > I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will
> As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level.
> RIG + SIS <> Free Will
> A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will.
> It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process.

If you insist that FW is  a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally
different from both determinism and causation, then you
won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur
is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging

> If you
> ask most people "is this free will?"  - they will say no.
> Free will (in most peoples estimation) requires a process that is
> neither random *nor* determinstic.

Surely not most people. Theres a lot
of compatibilists about, for instance.

> Not one that is both.

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