On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 4:20 PM, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: >>> On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. >>> >>> Unless you determined the reason. >> >> How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using >> what process? >> >> If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the >> particular state you're in? >> >> If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into >> some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule >> determined the choice. > > And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet > undetermined, as required
If there is no rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then what is it connects the state to the choice? The state occurs. Then the choice occurs. But nothing connects them? That is accidentalism isn't it? >>> I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will >> >> As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. >> >> RIG + SIS <> Free Will >> >> A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. >> It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. > > If you insist that FW is a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally > different from both determinism and causation, then you > won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur > is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging It seems to me that when people discuss free will, they are always really interested in "ultimate responsibility" for actions. Any defense of "free will" must allow for ultimate responsibility for actions. I say that ultimate responsibility is impossible, because neither caused actions nor random actions nor any combination of cause and randomness seems to result in "ultimate responsibility". Ultimate responsibility means that reward and punishment are justified for acts *even after* setting aside any utilitarian considerations. So *if* it were possible to be ultimately responsible for a bad act, we wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of deterring future bad behavior by the offender or others. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of rehabilitating the offender so that they don't commit similar bad acts in the future. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of motivating better behavior by them or others in the future. We wouldn't need to justify the offender's punishment in terms of compensating their victims or insuring social stability. Instead, we could justify the offender's punishment purely in terms of their ultimate responsibility for it. Using their free will, they chose to commit the bad act, and therefore they deserve the punishment. End of story. So, given that the punishment would no longer need to be justified in terms of anything other than ultimate responsibility, how would one justify limits on the punishment's severity? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
