On Dec 2, 6:29 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > > On 11/27/2010 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 12:49 PM, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>> Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can > >>> be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that > >>> can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink > >>> elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all > >>> happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my > >>> conscious experience. > > >> Isn't this just idealism? > > > If it were consistent it would be solipism. > > By inconsistency I assume that you are referring to my use of "you" > and "your" while claiming that, ultimately, Jason's conscious > experience has nothing to do with my conscious experience? > > If there are no causal connections between our experiences then...why > am I addressing him in my emails as though there were? > > There are three answers to this question: > > 1) To be consistent, I have to conclude that ultimately there is no > reason for this. It's just the way things are. That I do this is > just a fact, and not causally connected to any other facts. > > 2) The related fact that, lacking free will, I have no real choice > but to do this. > > 3) My "experienced" justification is that these emails are mostly an > opportunity to articulate, clarify, and develop my own thoughts on > these topics. I take an instrumentalist view of the process...it > doesn't matter what Jason's metaphysical status is. > > As to solipsism, meh. In what sense do you mean? > > Methodological solipsism, yes. Metaphysical solipsism, no. > > 1. My mental states are the only things I have access to. Yes.
How do you know that? > 2. From my mental states I cannot conclude the existence of anything > outside of my mental states. Yess You perhaps can't conclusively conclude, but then you are left with a best guess. > 3. Therefore I conclude that only my mental states exist. No. > > So, I only score two out three on the metaphysical solipsism checklist. > > Why do I reject #3? This comes back to taking a deflationary view of > "personage". It isn't "mental states belonging to Rex" so much as > "mental states whose contents include a Rex-like-point-of-view". > > I have recollections of mental states which did not include a Rex-like > point of view (Salvia!). Based on those recollections I find it > entirely plausible (though not certain) that non-Rex-flavored mental > states exist. > > But beyond that I can't say anything further about what kinds of > mental states do or don't exist. Maybe Jason's mental states exist, > maybe they don't. It's not really important. > > > It's when your conscious > > experience infers that you are communicating with another conscious > > experience that the need for an explanation of the similarity of the > > experiences is needed. Objective = intersubjective agreement. > > And I would say that trying to explain intersubjective experience is > getting a little ahead of things until one has a plausible explanation > of subjective experience. One only needs to go as far as the idea that mental states supervene on physical states. That is not a full explanation of consc. but is enough to explain how there are multiple subjects who experience a common world. > What can you reliably infer from your conscious experience without > knowing what conscious experience "is"? It's building a foundation on > top of something which has no foundation. So do it coherentisitcally then. Don;t take consciousness or the world to be epistemologically prior, but do find the best way of fitting them together. > From conscious experience, I'd think that you can only reliably infer > things about conscious experience, not about what exists outside of or > behind conscious experience. But the idea that CE is a "place" and everything is either inside it or outside it, is just a metaphor. It is certainly no better than the scientific metaphor. > As Hans Moravec says: > > "A simulated world hosting a simulated person can be a closed > self-contained entity. It might exist as a program on a computer > processing data quietly in some dark corner, giving no external hint > of the joys and pains, successes and frustrations of the person > inside. Inside the simulation events unfold according to the strict > logic of the program, which defines the 'laws of physics' of the > simulation. The inhabitant might, by patient experimentation and > inference, deduce some representation of the simulation laws, but not > the nature or even existence of the simulating computer. The > simulation's internal relationships would be the same if the program > were running correctly on any of an endless variety of possible > computers, slowly, quickly, intermittently, or even backwards and > forwards in time, with the data stored as charges on chips, marks on a > tape, or pulses in a delay line, with the simulation's numbers > represented in binary, decimal, or Roman numerals, compactly or spread > widely across the machine. There is no limit, in principle, on how > indirect the relationship between simulation and simulated can be." > > Without a limit on how indirect the relationship can be, then there's > no conclusions that can be drawn. > > And, as always, if the simulation of conscious experience can "just > exist", then why can't conscious experience itself just exist? Why can;t *your* conscious experience just exist? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.