Rex, Brent,

On 1/28/2011 7:59 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal<> wrote:

On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker< >

What does "locally" mean in this context? I doubt that consciousness is strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?

Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the

There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.

What's DM?

DM is digital mechanism, alias comp. It is the belief that my body is Turing emulable (be it by a physical reality or Robinson arithmetic). Comp, as an hypothesis is neutral about the primitive character of the physical reality. Then by MGA, it appears to be in conflict with weak materialism.

You're theory that the world is a subset of the computations of the universal dovetailer? In that case it certainly implies the possibility - in fact it seems to imply the possibility of far too much.

I have no theory. Only theorems in the Digital Mechanist *theory*. Also, the world is not a subset of the computations of the universal dovetailer. It is a first person (plural) view emerging from *all* computations, making it (the worlds) not Turing emulable, and never emulated by the UD. Just take into account the 1-indeterminacy.

That *this* implies too much is an open problem. Indeed it is *the* problem to which the mind-body problem has been reduced to in the DM theory.

In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on the most
probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations.

How do you mean "linear" computations? Is there a definition of the sum of two computations? or does it just refer to the computations being sequential?

Hmm... do you remember the combinator? A computation is linear if it does not eliminate information (no erasing), and it does not duplicate information (no copy). It is reversible also. Example: unitary transformations, or BCI algebra + S4-like modal operators. Thanks to the fact that the material hypostases prove, with p sigma_1, p -> BDp (what I called LASE on this list, the little abstract Schroedinger Equation), we have evidence that comp implies that the bottom of the physical laws is symmetrical and linear. In that setting it is natural to expect a good tensor product making it possible to "sum" computations. Cf also Girard linear logic and its "geometry of interaction". But for the qualia, Girard's logic is still too much physically motivated. WE have to extract this from Gödel, so that we can use the G/G* splitting to distinguish what the machine can prove and what is true about the machine, and why there exist physical laws at all.

Apes fetus can
dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period. With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when
"luckily" p is true,

So what is your response to Gettier's problem?  [Brent Meeker]

The answer is that, with comp, we cannot distinguish reality from dream. We can know that we are dreaming (sometimes), but we cannot ever know for sure in a public way that we are awaken. Another fact related to this is that knowledge, consciousness and truth are not machine-definable. If we are machine, we can use those notion in theoretical context only. In practice, as real life illustrates very often, we never know as such that we know. We belief we know, until we know better.

The SAGrz logics is a logical tour de force. Here Gödel's theorem gives sense to Theaetetus. S4Grz, the logic of (Bp & p) formalizes a notion which is not even nameable by the machine, unless she postulates comp and relies explicitly on that postulate, or better, relies on the study of a simpler than herself machine.

In science, or in public, we never know. Knowing is a pure first person notion. But this does not mean that we cannot make 3-theory on such pure first person notion, as S4Grz illustrates particularly well. Same remarks for feelings (Bp & Dt & p).


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