I wrote the paper to motivate the problem and show how QM is relevant even though it is not relevant from the usual physics perspective. I.e. decoherence prevents quantum phenomena from being relevant from the mechanistic point of view and you are then led to approach the problem from the point of view of classical physics.

At the end of the paper, I argue that one should reverse the logic. I don't delve into the details of how exactly to do this. So, my pepar is not incompatible with any paradigm that starts from mathematical reality.


Saibal

Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

Saibal,

You (still?) miss the first person indeterminacy. It leads to mathematicalism, even arithmeticalism, but it put self-referential constraints on how the physical realities, appaers actually how the coupling consciousness/realities (a sort of Galois connection) arise from arithmetic.

That's a bit astonsihing for an participant on this list. You proposal is wrong at the start, I think. You are not aware of the mind-body problem once you have comp, as you postulate yourself.

Your way of hunting the white rabbist still hides the first person rabbits. Too easy! You can't postulate the quantum laws.

Bruno



On 29 Jan 2011, at 16:51, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

On this list we've talked about "observer moments" (OM) quite a lot, but I always found the notion that some pattern represents a conscious state to be problematic.

I have written up a draft of a paper, see here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.4472

One can use the reasoning in the end of the paper to give a derivation of the Born rule by applying a similar formal reasoning as Zurek in this paper:

http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.5082

I plan to do that later.

Saibal

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