On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 04:42:46PM -0400, Rex Allen wrote: >> >> How can any of those questions be approached by conscious entities in >> a deterministic computational framework? >> >> Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every >> belief you’ll ever have is already locked in. >> >> Your life is “on rails”. Maybe your final destination is good, maybe >> it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static and >> fixed in Platonia. > > This is provably false.
What, exactly, are you claiming is provably false? > One of Bruno's important results is 3-determinism > implies 1-indeterminism. This is sort of anti-climactic after your initial statement. One of Bruno's important results is that if my future is determined, in some sense it's not determined "for me" as an individual. > It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your > while trying to understand. I think I understand this already. The whole teleporting moscow-washington thing, right? In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from the current state that represents "me". Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective standpoint. But, they're not possible, they're actual. In Platonia, they all exist. And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a series of "nows". So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future". But...really, it's determined. Every one of those paths is objectively actualized. So how does this prove what I said false? All those static "futures" are mine. They're all determined. I'm still on rails...it's just that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way. Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched path...this still doesn't make what I said false. I'm one of those paths, I just don't know which. But ignorance of the future is not indeterminism. Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully determined) future. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
