On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:02, B Soroud wrote:

I'm just critiquing this notion of Platonic Theology.... have youread Plotinus......

`Yes. I have even study again classical greek to study it, helping`

`myself with four translation. I love it. It is a true scientist. I`

`don't pretend to understand all of it, to be sure, or even to grasp`

`what he means, only that what he says makes much sense with the`

`natural discourse of the universal machines (which studied in`

`theoretical computer sciences).`

`But as I said, my point is scientific in the Popper sense. I pretend`

`that if my brain is machine, then Plotinus is coherently interpretable`

`in computer science/number theory. Given that the theology of machine`

`includes the whole physics, and that the proof is constructive, this`

`statement is experimentally testable.`

`And on the contrary, Aristotle theology is already refuted. I am aware`

`that Aristotle theology is *the* favorite theology of the atheists and`

`of the radical religious conventionalists, which makes platonism`

`rather far form the current paradigm. But that is a contingent fact.`

wasn't he a transcendentalist and ecstatic

`What do you mean by that? In what sense would you see this as a`

`critics of Plotinus.`

.... he wanted to think or will his way into some transcendenteternity or something.

`To just define what is a digital machine we need to make sense of the`

`natural numbers and the laws of addition and multiplication, so we do`

`have a notion of transcendent reality of some sort, once we assume`

`comp. We need this for saying "yes" to a digitalist surgeon who`

`proposes to you an artificial digital brain.`

`I insist: my point is not that this is true, but that once we say yes`

`to such a surgeon (by thought, qua the notion of computation) then`

`Plato is right and Aristotle is wrong (roughly speaking).`

`I use theology in the sense of Plato where GOD = TRUTH by definition`

`(following *some* scholars on this). This makes sense in the comp`

`theory because TRUTH is already not definable (like GOD has no name).`

`But comp allow indirect meta-names, and the logic gives the tools for`

`avoiding some of the typical theological traps (notably the`

`authoritative arguments). TRUTH can be approximated, and GOD can be`

`approached in the private ways (by the machines looking inward).`

Bruno

On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 3:00 AM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote: "A theory exists when enough people share some amount of intuition. " That is a pretty interesting insight to dwell on.On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:32, B Soroud wrote:indeed it is... I am saying that most everythign according to us isan anthropomorphization... we, and by extension, most everything,by virtue of us, is an anthropomorphization...But then it is even more deeply a mammalization, and even moredeeply a universal-machinization.but more importantly I want to say: so you believe that theseuniversal numbers have an existence in and of themselves and arebeing apprehended... not necessarily appreheneded or ascertained assuch, nor in theory.... but are you asserting that beings inthemselves in the abstract and theological sense are beingreflected to your thought in shadow form?I start from the fact that humans and machines can agree on simpleassertion about them. A theory exists when enough people share someamount of intuition.To be clear and avoid misunderstanding, I am not doing philosophy. Ido cognitive science/theoretical physics, or theology in theprechristian sense.My starting hypothesis is that my brain (or my generalized brain) isa finite things which can be substituted by a digital machine. Idon't know if that is true or not. I just derive the consequences.BrunoOn Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:36, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: is not any meta-phenomenological 'object', including the 'self', necessarily the construct of a third-person point of view...There is the 3-self. That is what you bet being your body, or whatyou need to remain alive/conscious.Then there is the 1-self, you as conscious person. The mind bodyproblem is the problem of relating those two things. It is not yetsolved, but I think some progress have perhaps been done.an essentially anthropomorphic third-person perception without anyobjective independent existence, or any determination as such.....andis not the negation of such an assertion assumed to be so and predicated on your human-being-ness and indirection... therefore proving the fact that "man is the measure of all things",IF we are machine, then the universal numbers (in the sense oftheoretical computer science) are better candidate for being themeasure of all things. They create the coupling consciousness/realties.It is an open question if they dreams/computations gluesufficiently well to define physical realities.and all things are relative to himself and have the status of third-person entities and nothing more except as projected by man. Why "by man"? Is that not an anthropomorphism? Bruno On Jun 4, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 04 Jun 2011, at 19:06, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: One thing I thought of recently which is a good way of showing how computation occurs due to the objective truth or falsehood of mathematical propositions is as follows: Most would agree that a statement such as "8 is composite" has an eternal objective truth. Assuming certain of axioms and rules of inference, sure. But everyone agree on the axioms of arithmetic. And we could take any universal (in the Turing sense) system instead. The physical laws cannot depend on the choice of the "universal base". Lat us continue with (N, +, *), because it is taught in high school. But isn't that true of nearly anything? How many axiomatic systems are there? Likewise the statement: the Nth fibbinacci number is X. Has an objective truth for any integer N no matter how large. Let's say N=10 and X = 55. The truth of this depends on the recursive definition of the fibbinacci sequence, where future states depend on prior states, and is therefore a kind if computation. Since N may be infinitely large, then in a sense this mathematical computation proceeds forever. Likewise one might say that chaitin's constant = Y has some objective mathematical truth. For chaintons constant to have an objective value, the execution of all programs must occur. Simple recursive relations can lead to exraordinary complexity, consider the universe of the Mandelbrot set implied by the simple relation Z(n +1)= Z(n)^2 + C. Other recursive formulae may result in the evolution of structures such as our universe or the computation of your mind. Is extraordinary complexity required for the manifestation of "mind"? If so, why?Is it that these recursive relations cause our experience, or arejusta way of thinking about our experience? Is it: Recursive relations cause thought. OR: Recursion is just a label that we apply to some of our implicational beliefs. I think you are confusing computability, which is absolute (assumingChurch thesis), and provability, which is always relative totheories,machines, entities, etc.Jason is right, computation occurs in "arithmetical platonia", evenina tiny part of it actually, independently of us. This tiny part is assumed in the rest of science, and comp makes it necessarily enough (by taking seriously the first and third person distinction). Bruno The latter seems more plausible to me. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . 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