"A theory exists when enough people share some amount of intuition. "
That is a pretty interesting insight to dwell on. On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:32, B Soroud wrote: > > indeed it is... I am saying that most everythign according to us is an > anthropomorphization... we, and by extension, most everything, by virtue of > us, is an anthropomorphization... > > > But then it is even more deeply a mammalization, and even more deeply a > universal-machinization. > > > > > > but more importantly I want to say: so you believe that these universal > numbers have an existence in and of themselves and are being apprehended... > not necessarily appreheneded or ascertained as such, nor in theory.... but > are you asserting that beings in themselves in the abstract and theological > sense are being reflected to your thought in shadow form? > > > I start from the fact that humans and machines can agree on simple > assertion about them. A theory exists when enough people share some amount > of intuition. > > To be clear and avoid misunderstanding, I am not doing philosophy. I do > cognitive science/theoretical physics, or theology in the prechristian > sense. > > My starting hypothesis is that my brain (or my generalized brain) is a > finite things which can be substituted by a digital machine. I don't know if > that is true or not. I just derive the consequences. > > Bruno > > > > > On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:36, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: >> >> is not any meta-phenomenological 'object', including the 'self', >>> necessarily the construct of a third-person point of view... >>> >> >> There is the 3-self. That is what you bet being your body, or what you >> need to remain alive/conscious. >> Then there is the 1-self, you as conscious person. The mind body problem >> is the problem of relating those two things. It is not yet solved, but I >> think some progress have perhaps been done. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> an >>> essentially anthropomorphic third-person perception without any >>> objective independent existence, or any determination as such..... and >>> is not the negation of such an assertion assumed to be so and >>> predicated on your human-being-ness and indirection... therefore >>> proving the fact that "man is the measure of all things", >>> >> >> IF we are machine, then the universal numbers (in the sense of theoretical >> computer science) are better candidate for being the measure of all things. >> They create the coupling consciousness/realties. >> It is an open question if they dreams/computations glue sufficiently well >> to define physical realities. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> and all >>> things are relative to himself and have the status of third-person >>> entities and nothing more except as projected by man. >>> >> >> Why "by man"? Is that not an anthropomorphism? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> On Jun 4, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 04 Jun 2011, at 19:06, Rex Allen wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> One thing I thought of recently which is a good way of showing how >>>>>> computation occurs due to the objective truth or falsehood of >>>>>> mathematical >>>>>> propositions is as follows: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> Most would agree that a statement such as "8 is composite" has an >>>>>> eternal >>>>>> objective truth. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> Assuming certain of axioms and rules of inference, sure. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But everyone agree on the axioms of arithmetic. And we could take any >>>> universal (in the Turing sense) system instead. The physical laws >>>> cannot depend on the choice of the "universal base". Lat us continue >>>> with (N, +, *), because it is taught in high school. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But isn't that true of nearly anything? How many axiomatic systems >>>>> are there? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Likewise the statement: the Nth fibbinacci number is X. >>>>>> Has an objective truth for any integer N no matter how large. >>>>>> Let's say >>>>>> N=10 and X = 55. The truth of this depends on the recursive >>>>>> definition of >>>>>> the fibbinacci sequence, where future states depend on prior >>>>>> states, and is >>>>>> therefore a kind if computation. Since N may be infinitely large, >>>>>> then in a >>>>>> sense this mathematical computation proceeds forever. Likewise one >>>>>> might >>>>>> say that chaitin's constant = Y has some objective mathematical >>>>>> truth. For >>>>>> chaintons constant to have an objective value, the execution of all >>>>>> programs >>>>>> must occur. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> Simple recursive relations can lead to exraordinary complexity, >>>>>> consider the >>>>>> universe of the Mandelbrot set implied by the simple relation Z(n >>>>>> +1)= Z(n)^2 >>>>>> + C. Other recursive formulae may result in the evolution of >>>>>> structures >>>>>> such as our universe or the computation of your mind. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> Is extraordinary complexity required for the manifestation of "mind"? >>>>> If so, why? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Is it that these recursive relations cause our experience, or are just >>>>> a way of thinking about our experience? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Is it: >>>>> >>>> >>>> Recursive relations cause thought. >>>>> >>>> >>>> OR: >>>>> >>>> >>>> Recursion is just a label that we apply to some of our implicational >>>>> beliefs. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think you are confusing computability, which is absolute (assuming >>>> Church thesis), and provability, which is always relative to theories, >>>> machines, entities, etc. >>>> >>>> Jason is right, computation occurs in "arithmetical platonia", even in >>>> a tiny part of it actually, independently of us. This tiny part is >>>> assumed in the rest of science, and comp makes it necessarily enough >>>> (by taking seriously the first and third person distinction). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The latter seems more plausible to me. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Rex >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>> com <[email protected]>. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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