"A theory exists when enough people share some amount of intuition. "

That is a pretty interesting insight to dwell on.

On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:32, B Soroud wrote:
>
> indeed it is... I am saying that most everythign according to us is an
> anthropomorphization... we, and by extension, most everything, by virtue of
> us, is an anthropomorphization...
>
>
> But then it is even more deeply a mammalization, and even more deeply a
> universal-machinization.
>
>
>
>
>
> but more importantly I want to say: so you believe that these universal
> numbers have an existence in and of themselves and are being apprehended...
> not necessarily appreheneded or ascertained as such, nor in theory.... but
> are you asserting that  beings in themselves in the abstract and theological
> sense are being reflected to your thought in shadow form?
>
>
> I start from the fact that humans and machines can agree on simple
> assertion about them. A theory exists when enough people share some amount
> of intuition.
>
> To be clear and avoid misunderstanding, I am not doing philosophy. I do
> cognitive science/theoretical physics, or theology in the prechristian
> sense.
>
> My starting hypothesis is that my brain (or my generalized brain) is a
> finite things which can be substituted by a digital machine. I don't know if
> that is true or not. I just derive the consequences.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:36, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>>
>>  is not any meta-phenomenological 'object', including the 'self',
>>> necessarily the construct of a third-person point of view...
>>>
>>
>> There is the 3-self. That is what you bet being your body, or what you
>> need to remain alive/conscious.
>> Then there is the 1-self, you as conscious person. The mind body problem
>> is the problem of relating those two things. It is not yet solved, but I
>> think some progress have perhaps been done.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  an
>>> essentially anthropomorphic third-person perception without any
>>> objective independent existence, or any determination as such..... and
>>> is not the negation of such an assertion assumed to be so and
>>> predicated on your human-being-ness and indirection... therefore
>>> proving the fact that "man is the measure of all things",
>>>
>>
>> IF we are machine, then the universal numbers (in the sense of theoretical
>> computer science) are better candidate for being the measure of all things.
>> They create the coupling consciousness/realties.
>> It is an open question if they dreams/computations glue sufficiently well
>> to define physical realities.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  and all
>>> things are relative to himself and have the status of third-person
>>> entities and nothing more except as projected by man.
>>>
>>
>> Why "by man"? Is that not an anthropomorphism?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Jun 4, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 04 Jun 2011, at 19:06, Rex Allen wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> One thing I thought of recently which is a good way of showing how
>>>>>> computation occurs due to the objective truth or falsehood of
>>>>>> mathematical
>>>>>> propositions is as follows:
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>  Most would agree that a statement such as "8 is composite" has an
>>>>>> eternal
>>>>>> objective truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>  Assuming certain of axioms and rules of inference, sure.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But everyone agree on the axioms of arithmetic. And we could take any
>>>> universal (in the Turing sense) system instead. The physical laws
>>>> cannot depend on the choice of the "universal base". Lat us continue
>>>> with (N, +, *), because it is taught in high school.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  But isn't that true of nearly anything?  How many axiomatic systems
>>>>> are there?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Likewise the statement: the Nth fibbinacci number is X.
>>>>>> Has an objective truth for any integer N no matter how large.
>>>>>> Let's say
>>>>>> N=10 and X = 55.  The truth of this depends on the recursive
>>>>>> definition of
>>>>>> the fibbinacci sequence, where future states depend on prior
>>>>>> states, and is
>>>>>> therefore a kind if computation.  Since N may be infinitely large,
>>>>>> then in a
>>>>>> sense this mathematical computation proceeds forever.  Likewise one
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> say that chaitin's constant = Y has some objective mathematical
>>>>>> truth.  For
>>>>>> chaintons constant to have an objective value, the execution of all
>>>>>> programs
>>>>>> must occur.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>  Simple recursive relations can lead to exraordinary complexity,
>>>>>> consider the
>>>>>> universe of the Mandelbrot set implied by the simple relation Z(n
>>>>>> +1)= Z(n)^2
>>>>>> + C.  Other recursive formulae may result in the evolution of
>>>>>> structures
>>>>>> such as our universe or the computation of your mind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>  Is extraordinary complexity required for the manifestation of "mind"?
>>>>> If so, why?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Is it that these recursive relations cause our experience, or are just
>>>>> a way of thinking about our experience?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Is it:
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Recursive relations cause thought.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  OR:
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Recursion is just a label that we apply to some of our implicational
>>>>> beliefs.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think you are confusing computability, which is absolute (assuming
>>>> Church thesis), and provability, which is always relative to theories,
>>>> machines, entities, etc.
>>>>
>>>> Jason is right, computation occurs in "arithmetical platonia", even in
>>>> a tiny part of it actually, independently of us. This tiny part is
>>>> assumed in the rest of science, and comp makes it necessarily enough
>>>> (by taking seriously the first and third person distinction).
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  The latter seems more plausible to me.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Rex
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  --
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