in principle.... but not necessarily in reality.

On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:02, B Soroud wrote:
>
> I'm just critiquing this notion of Platonic Theology.... have you read
> Plotinus......
>
>
> Yes. I have even study again classical greek to study it, helping myself
> with four translation. I love it. It is a true scientist. I don't pretend to
> understand all of it, to be sure, or even to grasp what he means, only that
> what he says makes much sense with the natural discourse of the universal
> machines (which studied in theoretical computer sciences).
>
> But as I said, my point is scientific in the Popper sense. I pretend that
> if my brain is machine, then Plotinus is coherently interpretable in
> computer science/number theory. Given that the theology of machine includes
> the whole physics, and that the proof is constructive, this statement is
> experimentally testable.
> And on the contrary, Aristotle theology is already refuted. I am aware that
> Aristotle theology is *the* favorite theology of the atheists and of the
> radical religious conventionalists, which makes platonism rather far form
> the current paradigm. But that is a contingent fact.
>
>
>
> wasn't he a transcendentalist and ecstatic
>
>
> What do you mean by that? In what sense would you see this as a critics of
> Plotinus.
>
>
>
>
>
> .... he wanted to think or will his way into some transcendent eternity or
> something.
>
>
> To just define what is a digital machine we need to make sense of the
> natural numbers and the laws of addition and multiplication, so we do have a
> notion of transcendent reality of some sort, once we assume comp.  We need
> this for saying "yes" to a digitalist surgeon who proposes to you an
> artificial digital brain.
> I insist: my point is not that this is true, but that once we say yes to
> such a surgeon (by thought, qua the notion of computation) then Plato is
> right and Aristotle is wrong (roughly speaking).
>
> I use theology in the sense of Plato where GOD = TRUTH by definition
> (following *some* scholars on this). This makes sense in the comp theory
> because TRUTH is already not definable (like GOD has no name). But comp
> allow indirect meta-names, and the logic gives the tools for avoiding some
> of the typical theological traps (notably the authoritative arguments).
> TRUTH can be approximated, and GOD can be approached in the private ways (by
> the machines looking inward).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 3:00 AM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> "A theory exists when enough people share some amount of intuition. "
>>
>> That is a pretty interesting insight to dwell on.
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:32, B Soroud wrote:
>>>
>>> indeed it is... I am saying that most everythign according to us is an
>>> anthropomorphization... we, and by extension, most everything, by virtue of
>>> us, is an anthropomorphization...
>>>
>>>
>>> But then it is even more deeply a mammalization, and even more deeply a
>>> universal-machinization.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> but more importantly I want to say: so you believe that these universal
>>> numbers have an existence in and of themselves and are being apprehended...
>>> not necessarily appreheneded or ascertained as such, nor in theory.... but
>>> are you asserting that  beings in themselves in the abstract and theological
>>> sense are being reflected to your thought in shadow form?
>>>
>>>
>>> I start from the fact that humans and machines can agree on simple
>>> assertion about them. A theory exists when enough people share some amount
>>> of intuition.
>>>
>>> To be clear and avoid misunderstanding, I am not doing philosophy. I do
>>> cognitive science/theoretical physics, or theology in the prechristian
>>> sense.
>>>
>>> My starting hypothesis is that my brain (or my generalized brain) is a
>>> finite things which can be substituted by a digital machine. I don't know if
>>> that is true or not. I just derive the consequences.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:36, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  is not any meta-phenomenological 'object', including the 'self',
>>>>> necessarily the construct of a third-person point of view...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There is the 3-self. That is what you bet being your body, or what you
>>>> need to remain alive/conscious.
>>>> Then there is the 1-self, you as conscious person. The mind body problem
>>>> is the problem of relating those two things. It is not yet solved, but I
>>>> think some progress have perhaps been done.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  an
>>>>> essentially anthropomorphic third-person perception without any
>>>>> objective independent existence, or any determination as such..... and
>>>>> is not the negation of such an assertion assumed to be so and
>>>>> predicated on your human-being-ness and indirection... therefore
>>>>> proving the fact that "man is the measure of all things",
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> IF we are machine, then the universal numbers (in the sense of
>>>> theoretical computer science) are better candidate for being the measure of
>>>> all things. They create the coupling consciousness/realties.
>>>> It is an open question if they dreams/computations glue sufficiently
>>>> well to define physical realities.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  and all
>>>>> things are relative to himself and have the status of third-person
>>>>> entities and nothing more except as projected by man.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why "by man"? Is that not an anthropomorphism?
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 4, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 04 Jun 2011, at 19:06, Rex Allen wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One thing I thought of recently which is a good way of showing how
>>>>>>>> computation occurs due to the objective truth or falsehood of
>>>>>>>> mathematical
>>>>>>>> propositions is as follows:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Most would agree that a statement such as "8 is composite" has an
>>>>>>>> eternal
>>>>>>>> objective truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Assuming certain of axioms and rules of inference, sure.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But everyone agree on the axioms of arithmetic. And we could take any
>>>>>> universal (in the Turing sense) system instead. The physical laws
>>>>>> cannot depend on the choice of the "universal base". Lat us continue
>>>>>> with (N, +, *), because it is taught in high school.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  But isn't that true of nearly anything?  How many axiomatic systems
>>>>>>> are there?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Likewise the statement: the Nth fibbinacci number is X.
>>>>>>>> Has an objective truth for any integer N no matter how large.
>>>>>>>> Let's say
>>>>>>>> N=10 and X = 55.  The truth of this depends on the recursive
>>>>>>>> definition of
>>>>>>>> the fibbinacci sequence, where future states depend on prior
>>>>>>>> states, and is
>>>>>>>> therefore a kind if computation.  Since N may be infinitely large,
>>>>>>>> then in a
>>>>>>>> sense this mathematical computation proceeds forever.  Likewise one
>>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>>> say that chaitin's constant = Y has some objective mathematical
>>>>>>>> truth.  For
>>>>>>>> chaintons constant to have an objective value, the execution of all
>>>>>>>> programs
>>>>>>>> must occur.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Simple recursive relations can lead to exraordinary complexity,
>>>>>>>> consider the
>>>>>>>> universe of the Mandelbrot set implied by the simple relation Z(n
>>>>>>>> +1)= Z(n)^2
>>>>>>>> + C.  Other recursive formulae may result in the evolution of
>>>>>>>> structures
>>>>>>>> such as our universe or the computation of your mind.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Is extraordinary complexity required for the manifestation of "mind"?
>>>>>>> If so, why?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Is it that these recursive relations cause our experience, or are
>>>>>>> just
>>>>>>> a way of thinking about our experience?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Is it:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Recursive relations cause thought.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  OR:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Recursion is just a label that we apply to some of our implicational
>>>>>>> beliefs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think you are confusing computability, which is absolute (assuming
>>>>>> Church thesis), and provability, which is always relative to theories,
>>>>>> machines, entities, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jason is right, computation occurs in "arithmetical platonia", even in
>>>>>> a tiny part of it actually, independently of us. This tiny part is
>>>>>> assumed in the rest of science, and comp makes it necessarily enough
>>>>>> (by taking seriously the first and third person distinction).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  The latter seems more plausible to me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Rex
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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