in principle.... but not necessarily in reality. On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:02, B Soroud wrote: > > I'm just critiquing this notion of Platonic Theology.... have you read > Plotinus...... > > > Yes. I have even study again classical greek to study it, helping myself > with four translation. I love it. It is a true scientist. I don't pretend to > understand all of it, to be sure, or even to grasp what he means, only that > what he says makes much sense with the natural discourse of the universal > machines (which studied in theoretical computer sciences). > > But as I said, my point is scientific in the Popper sense. I pretend that > if my brain is machine, then Plotinus is coherently interpretable in > computer science/number theory. Given that the theology of machine includes > the whole physics, and that the proof is constructive, this statement is > experimentally testable. > And on the contrary, Aristotle theology is already refuted. I am aware that > Aristotle theology is *the* favorite theology of the atheists and of the > radical religious conventionalists, which makes platonism rather far form > the current paradigm. But that is a contingent fact. > > > > wasn't he a transcendentalist and ecstatic > > > What do you mean by that? In what sense would you see this as a critics of > Plotinus. > > > > > > .... he wanted to think or will his way into some transcendent eternity or > something. > > > To just define what is a digital machine we need to make sense of the > natural numbers and the laws of addition and multiplication, so we do have a > notion of transcendent reality of some sort, once we assume comp. We need > this for saying "yes" to a digitalist surgeon who proposes to you an > artificial digital brain. > I insist: my point is not that this is true, but that once we say yes to > such a surgeon (by thought, qua the notion of computation) then Plato is > right and Aristotle is wrong (roughly speaking). > > I use theology in the sense of Plato where GOD = TRUTH by definition > (following *some* scholars on this). This makes sense in the comp theory > because TRUTH is already not definable (like GOD has no name). But comp > allow indirect meta-names, and the logic gives the tools for avoiding some > of the typical theological traps (notably the authoritative arguments). > TRUTH can be approximated, and GOD can be approached in the private ways (by > the machines looking inward). > > Bruno > > > > On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 3:00 AM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: > >> "A theory exists when enough people share some amount of intuition. " >> >> That is a pretty interesting insight to dwell on. >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:32, B Soroud wrote: >>> >>> indeed it is... I am saying that most everythign according to us is an >>> anthropomorphization... we, and by extension, most everything, by virtue of >>> us, is an anthropomorphization... >>> >>> >>> But then it is even more deeply a mammalization, and even more deeply a >>> universal-machinization. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> but more importantly I want to say: so you believe that these universal >>> numbers have an existence in and of themselves and are being apprehended... >>> not necessarily appreheneded or ascertained as such, nor in theory.... but >>> are you asserting that beings in themselves in the abstract and theological >>> sense are being reflected to your thought in shadow form? >>> >>> >>> I start from the fact that humans and machines can agree on simple >>> assertion about them. A theory exists when enough people share some amount >>> of intuition. >>> >>> To be clear and avoid misunderstanding, I am not doing philosophy. I do >>> cognitive science/theoretical physics, or theology in the prechristian >>> sense. >>> >>> My starting hypothesis is that my brain (or my generalized brain) is a >>> finite things which can be substituted by a digital machine. I don't know if >>> that is true or not. I just derive the consequences. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:36, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: >>>> >>>> is not any meta-phenomenological 'object', including the 'self', >>>>> necessarily the construct of a third-person point of view... >>>>> >>>> >>>> There is the 3-self. That is what you bet being your body, or what you >>>> need to remain alive/conscious. >>>> Then there is the 1-self, you as conscious person. The mind body problem >>>> is the problem of relating those two things. It is not yet solved, but I >>>> think some progress have perhaps been done. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> an >>>>> essentially anthropomorphic third-person perception without any >>>>> objective independent existence, or any determination as such..... and >>>>> is not the negation of such an assertion assumed to be so and >>>>> predicated on your human-being-ness and indirection... therefore >>>>> proving the fact that "man is the measure of all things", >>>>> >>>> >>>> IF we are machine, then the universal numbers (in the sense of >>>> theoretical computer science) are better candidate for being the measure of >>>> all things. They create the coupling consciousness/realties. >>>> It is an open question if they dreams/computations glue sufficiently >>>> well to define physical realities. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> and all >>>>> things are relative to himself and have the status of third-person >>>>> entities and nothing more except as projected by man. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Why "by man"? Is that not an anthropomorphism? >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jun 4, 1:09 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 04 Jun 2011, at 19:06, Rex Allen wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 12:21 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> One thing I thought of recently which is a good way of showing how >>>>>>>> computation occurs due to the objective truth or falsehood of >>>>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>>> propositions is as follows: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Most would agree that a statement such as "8 is composite" has an >>>>>>>> eternal >>>>>>>> objective truth. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Assuming certain of axioms and rules of inference, sure. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But everyone agree on the axioms of arithmetic. And we could take any >>>>>> universal (in the Turing sense) system instead. The physical laws >>>>>> cannot depend on the choice of the "universal base". Lat us continue >>>>>> with (N, +, *), because it is taught in high school. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But isn't that true of nearly anything? How many axiomatic systems >>>>>>> are there? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Likewise the statement: the Nth fibbinacci number is X. >>>>>>>> Has an objective truth for any integer N no matter how large. >>>>>>>> Let's say >>>>>>>> N=10 and X = 55. The truth of this depends on the recursive >>>>>>>> definition of >>>>>>>> the fibbinacci sequence, where future states depend on prior >>>>>>>> states, and is >>>>>>>> therefore a kind if computation. Since N may be infinitely large, >>>>>>>> then in a >>>>>>>> sense this mathematical computation proceeds forever. Likewise one >>>>>>>> might >>>>>>>> say that chaitin's constant = Y has some objective mathematical >>>>>>>> truth. For >>>>>>>> chaintons constant to have an objective value, the execution of all >>>>>>>> programs >>>>>>>> must occur. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Simple recursive relations can lead to exraordinary complexity, >>>>>>>> consider the >>>>>>>> universe of the Mandelbrot set implied by the simple relation Z(n >>>>>>>> +1)= Z(n)^2 >>>>>>>> + C. Other recursive formulae may result in the evolution of >>>>>>>> structures >>>>>>>> such as our universe or the computation of your mind. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Is extraordinary complexity required for the manifestation of "mind"? >>>>>>> If so, why? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it that these recursive relations cause our experience, or are >>>>>>> just >>>>>>> a way of thinking about our experience? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it: >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Recursive relations cause thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OR: >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Recursion is just a label that we apply to some of our implicational >>>>>>> beliefs. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I think you are confusing computability, which is absolute (assuming >>>>>> Church thesis), and provability, which is always relative to theories, >>>>>> machines, entities, etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Jason is right, computation occurs in "arithmetical platonia", even in >>>>>> a tiny part of it actually, independently of us. This tiny part is >>>>>> assumed in the rest of science, and comp makes it necessarily enough >>>>>> (by taking seriously the first and third person distinction). >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The latter seems more plausible to me. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Rex >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>>>> com <[email protected]>. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/** >>>>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>> com <[email protected]>. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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