well honestly, this is a extremely foreign view then the one I'm use to.... very sci fi seeming.... but interesting and worthy of exploration none the less.
On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:10, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: > > Bruno, can you go a little deeper into what you mean by this prime >> matter that you're skeptical of. >> > > It is the idea that there is a fundamental reality made of some stuff > having some fundamental ontology. It is mainly the primary matter as > introduced by Aristotle. This has led to materialism/naturalism/**physicalism, > which is the idea that physics is the fundamental science, and > matter-spece-time-energy the fundamental existant. > For the platonists, what we see and observe might be the shadow of a > deeper, non necessarily physical, reality, so that physics would not be a > fundamental science, but could be retrieved from a simpler theory. Indeed > with comp, physics can be retrieved from addition and multiplication (and > since Gödel, we know that addition and multiplication are not that easy). > > I might refer you to my sane04 paper(*) where I explain in english, and > rather shortly, why, once we assume mechanism (digital mechanism) then it > has to be necessarily like that (some use of Occam, or some nuances can be > added, 'course). The physical science are given by what is invariant in all > possible universal number's observation. This can already be shown to lead > to quantum logic. In fact most of the quantum weirdness are simple > consequence of the digital mechanist hypothesis, but the math shows that the > whole of quantum mechanics (including relativity) has to be retrieved from > computer science/number theory. > > If you are interested, ask any question. By construction, the argument is > accessible to any Löbian numbers, (as explained in the second part of the > sane04 paper). Even if comp is false, I can explain that *you* are at least > a Löbian number (comp is basically the statement that you are not MORE than > a Löbian number). Basically, a Löbian number is a code of a universal > machine which knows (in a weak technical sense) that she is a universal > machine. The theory "Peano Arithmetic" is already a Löbian number. > > I have gone a little deeper, here, but I can go much more deeper. Obviously > it is hard to sum this difficult subject with few words. Computationalism > makes possible to use computer science in the cognitive fundamental > science/philosophy. > > Bruno > > > (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/publications/** > SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html> > > > >> On Jul 1, 2:38 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:27, B Soroud wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, >>>> >>> >>> "It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If >>>> not you fall in solipsism." >>>> >>> >>> This doesn't work for me, we can go into this more deeply point by >>>> point, but suffice it to say that reality is not something separate >>>> from us.... people always make this mistake.... we are reality, we >>>> are a part of reality, and our experiences are perception dependent, >>>> in some naive and rudimentary sense, and our experience is >>>> physiologically, environmentally and conceptually conditioned, >>>> always... >>>> >>> >>> That is coherent with what I said. >>> >>> reality is a word that is losing much meaning for me nowadays.... >>>> >>> >>> But this does not follow. >>> >>> >>> >>> and as in response to the "we".... it is in the old Augustinean >>>> sense.... where you know what it is and paradoxically you don't know >>>> what it is.... >>>> >>> >>> That is the 1-person (even the singular 1-person). It is not really a >>> we. For a we, you need to already bet on a reality with other people. >>> >>> >>> >>> final quesiton.... has anyone here studied Hegel indepthly... I am >>>> starting to think that that is important to do.... and I'm getting >>>> ready to take it up. >>>> >>> >>> You might try to make a summary. I find it rather obscure, but >>> frequently some people find the universal numlber's discourse rather >>> Hegelian. I am not sure because he seems to believe in a phenomenology >>> of mind where I think we need a phenomenology of matter. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:15, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: >>>> >>> >>> "but I prefer to think of physics as a collection of models, models >>>> that map the territory, but are never the territory itself. " >>>> >>> >>> who's to say that there even is a territory or what it is? >>>> >>> >>> We assume this. Science start from theories, that is assumption. >>>> >>> >>> It seems to me that we are all presupposing some vague notion of >>>> "reality" to begin with, a notion as ambiguous, hypothetical, elusive, >>>> and complex as "god". >>>> >>> >>> I appreciate this. That is why science is the best tool of the >>>> serious theologian. >>>> >>> >>> we presuppose and pre-define a "reality" that we are trying to catch >>>> an adequate glimpse of. >>>> >>> >>> we project a pre-conceived notion of a goal and then go for it. >>>> >>> >>> As Nietzsche pointed out, perhaps there is no such thing as truth and >>>> reality, and even if there was, perhaps they are not only in some >>>> sense presupposed and implicitly pre-defined, but that they may even >>>> be highly overvalued. >>>> >>> >>> What I try to explain is that if we assume that we are machine, then >>>> we don't need more than (N, + *), ontologically. >>>> In science we are always modest, and never know-for-sure if our >>>> theories are true. We can only hope to be refuted. >>>> >>> >>> Science is not the truth per se. Science is doubt. >>>> >>> >>> If reality is conceived of like a Kantian "thing-in-itself" that is >>>> essentially Other then you and inaccessible, but you are trying to >>>> infer a conception of it..... what kind of conceptually conditioned >>>> "reality" is that? >>>> >>> >>> It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If >>>> not you fall in solipsism. >>>> >>> >>> I'm only thinking of reality here as in some "fundamental" and >>>> "systematic" sense. >>>> >>> >>> Before we think of science or physics as the royal road to reality, >>>> >>> >>> If we are machine, physics is not the royal road. But consciousness >>>> and numbers (or finite things) are, and then it can be shown how the >>>> physical realm emerge from the number, and this in a way which makes >>>> it testable. Science does not exist, but some human can develop a >>>> scientific attitude, which is a modest doubting skeptical ability >>>> which departs from the authoritative arguments. >>>> Given than the most fundamental science (theology) is still in the >>>> hands of "authorities", and has still not yet come back in academy, >>>> we can say that science has not yet really begun. We have not yet >>>> the right to doubt in theology (be it the atheist theology, or the >>>> conventional theologies). >>>> >>> >>> we >>>> have to recognize that we are the ones presupposing and preconceiving >>>> and predefining notions of reality to begin with. >>>> >>> >>> What do you mean by "we"? Is the term "we" used for the universal >>>> numbers, or we the mammals, or we the homeotherm animals, the >>>> creature of earth?, etc. >>>> >>> >>> If we don't make theories, we cannot be shown wrong, and we cannot >>>> progress. Science is a path from doubts to even more doubts. >>>> >>> >>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> On Jun 11, 7:51 am, Rex Allen <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> Instrumentalism, anyone? >>>> >>> >>> >>> http://www.americanscientist.**org/issues/id.12395,y.2011,no<http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.12395,y.2011,no> >>>> . >>>> 3,content.... >>>> >>> >>> The range of phenomena physics has explained is more than impressive; >>>> it underlies the whole of modern civilization. Nevertheless, as a >>>> physicist travels along his (in this case) career, the hairline cracks >>>> in the edifice become more apparent, as does the dirt swept under the >>>> rug, the fudges and the wholesale swindles, with the disconcerting >>>> result that the totality occasionally appears more like Bruegel’s >>>> Tower of Babel as dreamt by a modern slumlord, a ramshackle structure >>>> of compartmentalized models soldered together into a skewed heap of >>>> explanations as the whole jury-rigged monstrosity tumbles skyward. >>>> >>> >>> [...] >>>> >>> >>> Such examples abound throughout physics. Rather than pretending that >>>> they don’t exist, physics educators would do well to acknowledge when >>>> they invoke the Wizard working the levers from behind the curtain. >>>> Even towards the end of the twentieth century, physics was regarded as >>>> received Truth, a revelation of the face of God. Some physicists may >>>> still believe that, but I prefer to think of physics as a collection >>>> of models, models that map the territory, but are never the territory >>>> itself. That may smack of defeatism to many, but ultimate answers are >>>> not to be grasped by mortals. Physicists have indeed gone further than >>>> other scientists in describing the natural world; they should not >>>> confuse description with understanding. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>> >>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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