well honestly, this is a extremely foreign view then the one I'm use to....
very sci fi seeming.... but interesting and worthy of exploration none the
less.

On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <tmarc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:10, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>
>  Bruno, can you go a little deeper into what you mean by this prime
>> matter that you're skeptical of.
>>
>
> It is the idea that there is a fundamental reality made of some stuff
> having some fundamental ontology. It is mainly the primary matter as
> introduced by Aristotle. This has led to materialism/naturalism/**physicalism,
> which is the idea that physics is the fundamental science, and
> matter-spece-time-energy the fundamental existant.
> For the platonists, what we see and observe might be the shadow of a
> deeper, non necessarily physical, reality, so that physics would not be a
> fundamental science, but could be retrieved from a simpler theory. Indeed
> with comp, physics can be retrieved from addition and multiplication (and
> since Gödel, we know that addition and multiplication are not that easy).
>
> I might refer you to my sane04 paper(*) where I explain in english, and
> rather shortly, why, once we assume mechanism (digital mechanism) then it
> has to be necessarily like that (some use of Occam, or some nuances can be
> added, 'course). The physical science are given by what is invariant in all
> possible universal number's observation. This can already be shown to lead
> to quantum logic. In fact most of the quantum weirdness are simple
> consequence of the digital mechanist hypothesis, but the math shows that the
> whole of quantum mechanics (including relativity) has to be retrieved from
> computer science/number theory.
>
> If you are interested, ask any question. By construction, the argument is
> accessible to any Löbian numbers, (as explained in the second part of the
> sane04 paper). Even if comp is false, I can explain that *you* are at least
> a Löbian number (comp is basically the statement that you are not MORE than
> a Löbian number). Basically, a Löbian number is a code of a universal
> machine which knows (in a weak technical sense) that she is a universal
> machine. The theory "Peano Arithmetic" is already a Löbian number.
>
> I have gone a little deeper, here, but I can go much more deeper. Obviously
> it is hard to sum this difficult subject with few words. Computationalism
> makes possible to use computer science in the cognitive fundamental
> science/philosophy.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/publications/**
> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html>
>
>
>
>> On Jul 1, 2:38 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:27, B Soroud wrote:
>>>
>>>  Bruno,
>>>>
>>>
>>>  "It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If
>>>> not you fall in solipsism."
>>>>
>>>
>>>  This doesn't work for me, we can go into this more deeply point by
>>>> point, but suffice it to say that reality is not something separate
>>>> from us.... people always make this mistake.... we are reality, we
>>>> are a part of reality, and our experiences are perception dependent,
>>>> in some naive and rudimentary sense, and our experience is
>>>> physiologically, environmentally and conceptually conditioned,
>>>> always...
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is coherent with what I said.
>>>
>>>  reality is a word that is losing much meaning for me nowadays....
>>>>
>>>
>>> But this does not follow.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  and as in response to the "we".... it is in the old Augustinean
>>>> sense.... where you know what it is and paradoxically you don't know
>>>> what it is....
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is the 1-person (even the singular 1-person). It is not really a
>>> we. For a we, you need to already bet on a reality with other people.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  final quesiton.... has anyone here studied Hegel indepthly... I am
>>>> starting to think that that is important to do.... and I'm getting
>>>> ready to take it up.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You might try to make a summary. I find it rather obscure, but
>>> frequently some people find the universal numlber's discourse rather
>>> Hegelian. I am not sure because he seems to believe in a phenomenology
>>> of mind where I think we need a phenomenology of matter.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>  On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:15, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>  "but I prefer to think of physics as a collection of models, models
>>>> that map the territory, but are never the territory itself. "
>>>>
>>>
>>>  who's to say that there even is a territory or what it is?
>>>>
>>>
>>>  We assume this. Science start from theories, that is assumption.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  It seems to me that we are all presupposing some vague notion of
>>>> "reality" to begin with, a notion as ambiguous, hypothetical, elusive,
>>>> and complex as "god".
>>>>
>>>
>>>  I appreciate this. That is why science is the best tool of the
>>>> serious theologian.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  we presuppose and pre-define a "reality" that we are trying to catch
>>>> an adequate glimpse of.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  we project a pre-conceived notion of a goal and then go for it.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  As Nietzsche pointed out, perhaps there is no such thing as truth and
>>>> reality, and even if there was, perhaps they are not only in some
>>>> sense presupposed and implicitly pre-defined, but that they may even
>>>> be highly overvalued.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  What I try to explain is that if we assume that we are machine, then
>>>> we don't need more than (N, + *), ontologically.
>>>> In science we are always modest, and never know-for-sure if our
>>>> theories are true. We can only hope to be refuted.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Science is not the truth per se. Science is doubt.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  If reality is conceived of like a Kantian "thing-in-itself" that is
>>>> essentially Other then you and inaccessible, but you are trying to
>>>> infer a conception of it..... what kind of conceptually conditioned
>>>> "reality" is that?
>>>>
>>>
>>>  It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If
>>>> not you fall in solipsism.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  I'm only thinking of reality here as in some "fundamental" and
>>>> "systematic" sense.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Before we think of science or physics as the royal road to reality,
>>>>
>>>
>>>  If we are machine, physics is not the royal road. But consciousness
>>>> and numbers (or finite things) are, and then it can be shown how the
>>>> physical realm emerge from the number, and this in a way which makes
>>>> it testable. Science does not exist, but some human can develop a
>>>> scientific attitude, which is a modest doubting skeptical ability
>>>> which departs from the authoritative arguments.
>>>> Given than the most fundamental science (theology) is still in the
>>>> hands of "authorities", and has still not yet come back in academy,
>>>> we can say that science has not yet really begun. We have not yet
>>>> the right to doubt in theology (be it the atheist theology, or the
>>>> conventional theologies).
>>>>
>>>
>>>  we
>>>> have to recognize that we are the ones presupposing and preconceiving
>>>> and predefining notions of reality to begin with.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  What do you mean by "we"? Is the term "we" used for the universal
>>>> numbers, or we the mammals, or we the homeotherm animals, the
>>>> creature of earth?, etc.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  If we don't make theories, we cannot be shown wrong, and we cannot
>>>> progress. Science is a path from doubts to even more doubts.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Bruno
>>>>
>>>
>>>  On Jun 11, 7:51 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Instrumentalism, anyone?
>>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>> http://www.americanscientist.**org/issues/id.12395,y.2011,no<http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.12395,y.2011,no>
>>>> .
>>>> 3,content....
>>>>
>>>
>>>  The range of phenomena physics has explained is more than impressive;
>>>> it underlies the whole of modern civilization. Nevertheless, as a
>>>> physicist travels along his (in this case) career, the hairline cracks
>>>> in the edifice become more apparent, as does the dirt swept under the
>>>> rug, the fudges and the wholesale swindles, with the disconcerting
>>>> result that the totality occasionally appears more like Bruegel’s
>>>> Tower of Babel as dreamt by a modern slumlord, a ramshackle structure
>>>> of compartmentalized models soldered together into a skewed heap of
>>>> explanations as the whole jury-rigged monstrosity tumbles skyward.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  [...]
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Such examples abound throughout physics. Rather than pretending that
>>>> they don’t exist, physics educators would do well to acknowledge when
>>>> they invoke the Wizard working the levers from behind the curtain.
>>>> Even towards the end of the twentieth century, physics was regarded as
>>>> received Truth, a revelation of the face of God. Some physicists may
>>>> still believe that, but I prefer to think of physics as a collection
>>>> of models, models that map the territory, but are never the territory
>>>> itself. That may smack of defeatism to many, but ultimate answers are
>>>> not to be grasped by mortals. Physicists have indeed gone further than
>>>> other scientists in describing the natural world; they should not
>>>> confuse description with understanding.
>>>>
>>>
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