On 09 Jul 2011, at 06:02, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/8/2011 8:08 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 11:01 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 7/8/2011 7:35 PM, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
it makes so much sense.....
the doctrine of physicalism is in the least on the same plane as any
idealistic metaphysics, especially some form of objective idealism.
But in my eye… the fairer judgment is that some form of idealistic
metaphysics is in fact situated a step above physicalism in
probability and satisfactory of coherence.
And has idealistic metaphysics ever made a successful prediction or
informed a useful product?
Metaphysics has nothing to do with prediction. Metaphysics is
about interpretation and meaning.
But the metaphysics of materialism has been the philosophical guide
of science since the renaissance. Idealism has been the metaphysics
of mystics and charlatans.
This is debatable. Idealism was just an option for those who invented
the sciences, and materialism has been without doubt an excellent
methodological assumption, but it might be the bullet of the mind-body
problem. And I don't think it makes sense at all once we bet on
mechanism.
But even without mechanism, we can be skeptical on the interpretation
of the physical laws. Those are amazing relations between measurable
numbers, but where does those relations come from, and how do they
related to experiences, including the experience of the experimenters?
Bruno
In other words: What do we make of the fact that these predictions
were successful (or not)? What does this mean with respect to our
beliefs about what kinds of things exist?
The things we take to exist are the elements of our successful models.
Brent
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