>Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a system
>that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
>recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by definition
>computable!

The recipe is computable, (as is the menu, description, chemical
analysis), but the meal isn't. A recipe for virtual molecules isn't
sufficient to develop actual molecules that would be perceived as such
by microorganisms, other actual molecules, dogs, cats, etc. Only we
know how to access the simulation that we imagine resembles a
molecule. There is no objective quality of resemblance without a
subjective intepreter, there's just separate phenomena. One iron atom
has nothing do with another iron atom unless there is some perceiver
to recognize a common pattern. A does not equal A unless we perceive
pattern and similarity. These things are not a given. A cat doesn't do
A = A. Maybe >{tuna}< = >{tuna}<.

>>> The path that energy takes determines the content of the experience to
>>> some extent, but it is the physical nature of the materials through
>>> which the continuous sense of interaction occurs which determine the
>>> quality or magnitude of possible qualitative elaboration (physical,
>>> chemo, bio, zoo-physio, neuro, cerebral) of that experience.
>
>> How?
>
>Umm, Craig, no. Energy is defined by the path of events of the
>interaction. This is why the word "action" is used. We have a notion of
>least action which relates to the minimum configuration of a system, the
>content of the experience *is* the "inside view" of the process that
>strives always for that minimum.

What I'm saying though is that an animated sculpture of a cell made
from plaster is not a cell. Each plaster organelle and every plaster
cast of a chromosome wired up with finely articulated servo motors or
whatever - filled with microbeads of clear plastic or whatever... that
thing is never going to go through mitosis. It's not made of units
that know how to do that. Even if it's built to produce more plaster
and beads, to create more copies of itself (which would still be going
outside of the level on which the simulation would formally have to be
compared to be analogous to emulating feeling), it's not having an
experience of survival or sense, it's having an experience of plaster
and plastic. There may not be an absolutely objective difference
between a living cell and the molecules that compose it, but our
perception is that there is a significant difference, which only gets
more significant the further an embryo gets from a sand castle. There
is no point where a sand castle is so complex that it becomes capable
of meta-sand castelry. It won't ever come to life by itself, even if
it's the size of the Andromeda galaxy.

>it is as if we dissolve
>everything into a soup and say: See, Existence is soup!

Right, that's how I see my understanding of comp as well. If you
disqualify everything that isn't computable, then what you are left
with is computable.

>> Comp explains completely why feelings are NOT numbers. You don't study
>> the theory, and you criticize only your own prejudice about numbers
>> and machines.
>
>> You can use non-comp, as you seem to desire, but then tell us what is
>> not Turing emulable in "organic matter"?
>
>> Bruno
>
>Craig, Bruno has a point there. Be sure that you are not arguing against
>a straw man unintesionally!

Yeah, I would need to know how comp explains feelings exactly. I'm
just going by my observation that numbers are in many ways everything
that feeling is not. To get to the feeling of numbers, you have to
look at something like numerology.


On Jul 22, 5:24 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Hi Bruno and Craig,
>
> On 7/22/2011 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
> >>> substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be emulated by
> >>> a computer
>
> >> But it can only be emulated in a virtual environment interfacing with
> >> a computer literate human being though.
>
> > Why. That's begging the question.
>
> Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a system
> that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
> recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by definition
> computable!
>
>
>
> >> A real mouse will not be able
> >> to live on virtual cheese.
>
> > But a virtual mouse will (I will talk *in* the comp theory).
>
> Virtual mice eat virtual cheese and get virtual calories from it! Be
> careful that your not forcing a multi-leveled concept into a single
> conceptual level.
>
> >> Why can't consciousness be considered
> >> exactly the same way, as an irreducible correlate of specific meta-
> >> meta-meta-elaborations of matter?
>
> > What do you mean by matter? Primitive matter does not exist. A TOE has
> > to explain where the belief in matter comes from without assuming it.
>
> OK, Bruno, would you stop saying that unless you explicitly explain what
> you mean by "primitive matter"? The point that "A TOE has to explain
> where the belief in matter comes from without assuming it" is very
> important, though, but you might agree that that kind of multi-leveled
> TOE is foreign to most people. Not many people consider that a Theory of
> Everything must contain not only a representation of waht is observed
> but also the means and methods of the observations there of, or else it
> is not a theory of *Everything*. This actually makes the concept of a
> TOE subject to Incompleteness considerations!
>
>
>
> >>> All what consciousness (and matter) needs is a sufficiently rich
> >>> collection of self-referential relations. It happens that the numbers,
> >>> by the simple laws of addition and multiplication provides already
> >>> just that. Adding some ontological elements can only make the mind
> >>> body problem more complex to even just formulate.
>
> >> Information is not consciousness. Energy is the experience of being
> >> informed and informing, but it is not information.
>
> > I agree.
>
> Indeed!
>
>
>
> >> This is why a brain
> >> must be alive and conscious (not in a coma) to be informed or inform,
> >> and why a computer must be turned on to execute programs, or a
> >> mechanical computing system has to have kinetic initialization, etc.
>
> > Not at all. All you need are relative genuine relations. That does
> > explain both the origin of quanta and qualia, including the difference
> > of the quantitative and the qualitative.
>
> But Bruno, you are side-stepping the vital question of persistance and
> transitivity in that notion of "genuine relations." One's TOE has to
> account for the appearance of time, even it it is not primitive. It is
> not enough to show that matter is not primitive, we have to show how the
> image of an evolving matter universe is possible.  So far we are
> implying it via diamonds, but diamonds do not map in ways that are
> necessary to code interactions.
>
>
>
> >> The path that energy takes determines the content of the experience to
> >> some extent, but it is the physical nature of the materials through
> >> which the continuous sense of interaction occurs which determine the
> >> quality or magnitude of possible qualitative elaboration (physical,
> >> chemo, bio, zoo-physio, neuro, cerebral) of that experience.
>
> > How?
>
> Umm, Craig, no. Energy is defined by the path of events of the
> interaction. This is why the word "action" is used. We have a notion of
> least action which relates to the minimum configuration of a system, the
> content of the experience *is* the "inside view" of the process that
> strives always for that minimum.
>
>
>
> >> Physical
> >> will take you to detection, chemo to sense, bio to feeling, zoo to
> >> emotion, neuro to cognition, cerebral to full abstraction (colloquial
> >> terms here, not asserting a formal taxonomy).
>
> > You say so, but my point is that if you assume matter, your theory
> > needs very special form of infinities. Which one?
>
> Could explain this necessity, Bruno?
>
>
>
> >> All are forms of
> >> awareness. Consciousness implies awareness of awareness
>
> > That is self-consciousness.
>
> Consciousness does not require a model of self that is integrated into
> the content of consciousness, therefore consciousness is not reflexive
> in the primitive sense.
>
>
>
> >> which maybe
> >> comes at the neuro or  cerebral level, maybe lower? It has nothing to
> >> do with the complexity of the path that the energy takes. Complexity
> >> is an experience, not a discrete ontological condition.
>
> > You need infinities to make complexity an experience, and that is like
> > putting the horse behind the car.
>
> Please explain this.
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> Adding some ontological elements can only make the mind
> >>> body problem more complex to even just formulate.
>
> >> This makes me think that you are sentimental about protecting the
> >> simplicity of an abstract formula, rather than faithfully representing
> >> the problem.
>
> > I was mentioning the mind-body problem. No formula was involved. You
> > put infinities and uncomputability everywhere, where comp put it in
> > very special place with complete justification.
>
> >> I'm not especially interested in the 'easy' problem of
> >> consciousness.
>
> > Me neither.
>
> >> It's a worthwhile problem, to be sure, it's just not my
> >> thing. I do think, however, that if we can accurately describe the
> >> pattern of what the hard problem seems to arise from, it may have
> >> implications for both the easy and hard problems. At worst, my view
> >> limits the aspirations of inorganic materials to simulate
> >> consciousness,
>
> > That is vitalism. It fails to explain anything. It makes the problem
> > less tractable. It is similar to the God of the gap. Comp explains why
> > there is a gap. I am not sure you study the theory.
>
> OTOH, Bruno. one cannot gloss over the way that quantum logic is
> non-distributive. Reducing all to combinators or numbers that do not
> involve this seems doomed from the start. it is as if we dissolve
> everything into a soup and say: See, Existence is soup!
>
>
>
>
>
> >> but I don't see that as anything more than an
> >> identification of how the cosmos works. We don't want to create
> >> consciousness, we can do that already by reproducing. We want an
> >> omnipotent glove for the hand of consciousness that we already have.
> >> That seems easier to accomplish if we are not convincing ourselves
> >> that feelings must be numbers.
>
> > Comp explains completely why feelings are NOT numbers. You don't study
> > the theory, and you criticize only your own prejudice about numbers
> > and machines.
>
> > You can use non-comp, as you seem to desire, but then tell us what is
> > not Turing emulable in "organic matter"?
>
> > Bruno
>
> Craig, Bruno has a point there. Be sure that you are not arguing against
> a straw man unintesionally!
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
> >> On Jul 21, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>> On 21 Jul 2011, at 12:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>>> I don't have a problem with living neurological systems extending
> >>>> their functionality with mechanical prosthetics, it's the other way
> >>>> around that is more of an issue. People driving cars doesn't mean cars
> >>>> driving human minds.
>
> >>> Sure, but we do both: robots with neurons, and animals, including
> >>> humans, with the brain partially replaced by artificial neurons.
> >>> Anyway, if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
> >>> substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be emulated by
> >>> a computer. The only way to negate computationalism consists in
> >>> pretending there is some NON Turing-emulable activity going on in the
> >>> brain, and relevant for consciousness. In that case, there is no
> >>> possible level of digital substitution.
>
> >>> Note that all physical phenomena known today are Turing emulable,
> >>> even, in some sense, quantum indeterminacy (in the QM without
> >>> collapse) where the indeterminacy is a first person view of a
> >>> digitalisable self-multiplication experiment.
>
> >>> All what consciousness (and matter) needs is a sufficiently rich
> >>> collection of self-referential relations. It happens that the numbers,
> >>> by the simple laws of addition and multiplication provides already
> >>> just that. Adding some ontological elements can only make the mind
> >>> body problem more complex to even just formulate.
>
> >>> Bruno
>
> >>>> On Jul 21, 5:48 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>>> On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:58, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>>>>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:40 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >>>>>> <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>> Chickens can walk around for a while without a head also. It
> >>>>>>> doesn't
> >>>>>>> mean that air is a viable substitute for a head, and it doesn't
> >>>>>>> mean
> >>>>>>> that the head isn't producing a different quality of awareness than
> >>>>>>> it
> >>>>>>> does under typical non-mortally wounded conditions.
>
> >>>>>> I think you have failed to address the point made by several
> >>>>>> people so
> >>>>>> far, which is that if the replacement neurons can interact with the
> >>>>>> remaining biological neurons in a normal way, then it is not
> >>>>>> possible
> >>>>>> for there to be a change in consciousness. The important thing is
> >>>>>> **behaviour of the replacement neurons from the point of view of the
> >>>>>> biological neurons**.
>
> >>>>> And interfacing biological neurons with non biological circuits is
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> sci.fi., nowadays.
>
> >>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-0eZytv6Qk&feature=related
>
> >>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QPiF4-iu6g&feature=fvwrel
>
> >>>>>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-EvOlJp5KIY
>
> >>>>> This is NOT
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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