On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons? > > It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons participating in > the network, or, more likely, the unfavorable ration of neurons to > pegs.
Ie, the replacements are not functionally equivalent, even though they are stipulated as being equivalent. > > But that's the crux of the argument. If behavior isn't everything then, > > according to you, a person whose brain has been replaced by artificial, > > but functionally identical elements, could be a philosophical zombie. > > One who's every behavior is exactly like a person with a biological > > brain - including reporting the same feelings. Yet that is contrary to > > your assertion that they would exhibit dementia. > > The reason we won't get a philosophical zombie is that the premise > that an artificial simulation of a nervous system cell can be > functionally identical is faulty. Identical is identical. Artificial > is not. Indentical in all relevant aspects is good enough. That's a necessary truth. It might be the case that all relevant aspects are all aspects (IOW.,holism is true and functionalism is false). That isnt a necessary truth either way. It needs to be argued on the basis of some sort of evidence. > The degree to which the peg resembles the cell physically may > directly limit it's functional viability, because what we see of a > cell from the outside is only half of what the cell is. The other half > requires that we be the cell. We may not be able to be a non-cell at > all, even though from the outside it's function seems the same as > natural cells. > > To set the equivalence between the natural and artificial neuron in > advance is to load the question. and vice versa. > It assumes already that it is the > function of the brain to create consciousness through neurological > activity, whereas I think that the reality is neurological activity > and consciousness are both causes and symptoms of each other. > Imitating the neuron's behavior doesn't automatically invoke the > ability to imitate a neuron's awareness. It's the awareness of the > neurons themselves that is aggregated as our human consciousness, not > just the web of interactions between them. > > > > Exactly what I've been saying. If you model only the superficial > > > behaviors, you can't expect the meaningful roots of those behaviors to > > > appear spontaneously. > > > No you've been saying more than that. You've been saying that even if > > the artificial elements emulate the biological ones at a very low level > > they won't work unless they *are* biological. When I said that if you > > have to model at the quark level you might as well make up "real" > > neurons that was a recommendation of efficiency. According to Bruno, > > and functionalist theory, it might be very inefficient to emulate the > > quarks with a Turing machine but it is in principle equally effective. > > It's not that they have to *be* biological, it's that the simulation > has to use materials which can honor the biological level of > intelligence as well as the neurological. Why? If what you have is a functional black box ITFP, the it doens't mater what is inside the black box. >Silicon is already made of > something that behaves in a certain way. The strengths of that > material, it's reliable, semiconductive nature makes it ideally > transparent to project our own sensorimotive patterns through. That > quality is the very thing that prevents it from every being able to > host an unreliable, multivalent subjective entity. Posted about this > last night: The Glass Brain -http://s33light.org/post/7959078633 > > Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
