On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Where does the badness come from?  The afferent neurons?
>
> It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons participating in
> the network, or, more likely, the unfavorable ration of neurons to
> pegs.


Ie, the replacements are not functionally equivalent, even though
they are stipulated as being equivalent.

> > But that's the crux of the argument.  If behavior isn't everything then,
> > according to you, a person whose brain has been replaced by artificial,
> > but functionally identical elements, could be a philosophical zombie.  
> > One who's every behavior is exactly like a person with a biological
> > brain - including reporting the same feelings.  Yet that is contrary to
> > your assertion that they would exhibit dementia.
>
> The reason we won't get a philosophical zombie is that the premise
> that an artificial simulation of a nervous system cell can be
> functionally identical is faulty. Identical is identical. Artificial
> is not.

Indentical in all relevant aspects is good enough. That's a necessary
truth.
It might
be the case that all relevant aspects are all aspects (IOW.,holism is
true
and functionalism is false). That isnt  a necessary truth either way.
It
needs to be argued on the basis of some sort of evidence.

> The degree to which the peg resembles the cell physically may
> directly limit it's functional viability, because what we see of a
> cell from the outside is only half of what the cell is. The other half
> requires that we be the cell. We may not be able to be a non-cell at
> all, even though from the outside it's function seems the same as
> natural cells.
>
> To set the equivalence between the natural and artificial neuron in
> advance is to load the question.

and vice versa.

> It assumes already that it is the
> function of the brain to create consciousness through neurological
> activity, whereas I think that the reality is neurological activity
> and consciousness are both causes and symptoms of each other.
> Imitating the neuron's behavior doesn't automatically invoke the
> ability to imitate a neuron's awareness. It's the awareness of the
> neurons themselves that is aggregated as our human consciousness, not
> just the web of interactions between them.
>
> > > Exactly what I've been saying. If you model only the superficial
> > > behaviors, you can't expect the meaningful roots of those behaviors to
> > > appear spontaneously.
>
> > No you've been saying more than that.  You've been saying that even if
> > the artificial elements emulate the biological ones at a very low level
> > they won't work unless they *are* biological.  When I said that if you
> > have to model at the quark level you might as well make up "real"
> > neurons that was a recommendation of efficiency.  According to Bruno,
> > and functionalist theory, it might be very inefficient to emulate the
> > quarks with a Turing machine but it is in principle equally effective.
>
> It's not that they have to *be* biological, it's that the simulation
> has to use materials which can honor the biological level of
> intelligence as well as the neurological.

Why? If what you have is a functional black
box ITFP, the it doens't mater what is inside
the black box.

>Silicon is already made of
> something that behaves in a certain way. The strengths of that
> material, it's reliable, semiconductive nature makes it ideally
> transparent to project our own sensorimotive patterns through. That
> quality is the very thing that prevents it from every being able to
> host an unreliable, multivalent subjective entity. Posted about this
> last night: The Glass Brain -http://s33light.org/post/7959078633
>
> Craig

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