On Jul 23, 6:36 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Jul 23, 12:02 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > > On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons? > > > > It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons participating in > > > the network, or, more likely, the unfavorable ration of neurons to > > > pegs. > > > Ie, the replacements are not functionally equivalent, even though > > they are stipulated as being equivalent. > > No. You're equating the function of the network with the identity of > the participants. I can have an incoherent conversation over a crystal > clear phone system if I am trying to talk to people who are no longer > there, but have only voicemail. Even elaborate voicemail which > operates at the phonetic level to generate AI responses in any > language is not necessarily going to be able to answer my questions:
I have no idea what any of that has to do with functional equivalence. > 'Hey Freddie28283457701, did you get the glutamate I ordered yet?' > 'Thank you for calling. Your call is important to us. Please stay on > the line'. 'Wow that really sounds just like you Freddie, now where is > the damn glutamate?' > > > Indentical in all relevant aspects is good enough. That's a necessary > > truth. > > It's not possible to know what the relevant aspects are says who? >. What are the > relevant aspects of yellow? > > > It might > > be the case that all relevant aspects are all aspects (IOW.,holism is > > true > > and functionalism is false). That isnt a necessary truth either way. > > It > > needs to be argued on the basis of some sort of evidence. > > Not necessarily all aspects, but my hypothesis is that you need > material technologies to simulate more than the top level semantic i/ > o. Water seems to be important in distinguishing that which can live > and that which cannot. I might start there. That still needs to be argued. > > > To set the equivalence between the natural and artificial neuron in > > > advance is to load the question. > > > and vice versa. > > The burden of proof is on the hypothetical artificial neuron to prove > it's equivalent. It's hypothesised as equivalent. >The natural neuron doesn't have to prove that it's > nothing more than the artificial one since we know for a fact that our > entire world is somehow produced in the brain without any external > evidence whatsoever of that world. > > > It's not that they have to *be* biological, it's that the simulation > > > has to use materials which can honor the biological level of > > > intelligence as well as the neurological. > > > Why? If what you have is a functional black > > box ITFP, the it doens't mater what is inside > > the black box. > > It does if you ARE the black box. If you can be replaced, preserving functionality, maybe you don't matter so much > Craighttp://s33light.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.